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The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney
General: A Model for Enforcing the Civil
Rights of Undocumented Workers
Kathleen Kimt
On August 25, 2008, federal agents from Immigration and
Customs Enforcement ("ICE") raided the Howard Industries
electronics factory in Laurel, Mississippi.1 Five hundred and ni-
nety-two immigrant workers were taken into custody, making it
the largest workplace raid in U.S. history. The previous May,
nine hundred ICE agents raided the Agriprocessors meatpacking
plant in Postville, Iowa, detaining 389 immigrant workers. 2 Most
of these workers were charged with immigration violations and
have been or will be deported as a result.3 In the aftermath of
these raids, pervasive labor violations existing in these worksites
have been revealed. An underage worker at the Postville plant
reported feeling "like a slave," laboring excessive hours under his
employer's threat of deportation if he complained. 4 At Howard
Industries in Laurel, a worker in removal proceedings spoke of
the factory's "terrible working conditions," which aggravated her
asthma.5 The factory had been cited previously for health and
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1 Kari Lydersen, An Unfolding Crisis in the Wake of Mississippi ICE Raid, In These
Times (Sept 19, 2008), available at <www.inthesetimes.com/article/3928/an-unfolding-
crisis in.the wake of mississippiice raid> (last visited July 9, 2009) (describing the
effects of a recent raid by ICE in Mississippi from the perspectives of undocumented
workers and their advocates).
2 Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor Inquiries, NY Times Al
(July 27, 2008) (discussing labor violations brought to light as a result of interviews with
undocumented workers detained during the Postville raid).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Lydersen, An Unfolding Crisis in the Wake of Mississippi ICE Raid, In These
Times (cited in note 1).
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safety violations and was also in dispute with the local union
over better pay and benefits. An immigrant workers' rights advo-
cate remarked that these raids and others like it followed an "in-
teresting pattern: Four of the last major raids had a similar situ-
ation where union negotiations were going on or workers rights
violations were being investigated."6 Although U.S. laws prohibit
labor abuse against both citizen and non-citizen workers and
provide civil remedies to all workers injured by such abuse, many
of the workplace violations experienced by the undocumented
workers at Howard Industries and Agriprocessors will remain
unvindicated as a result of the workers' immigration detention
and deportation.
These examples highlight the inherent tension between the
restrictive goals of immigration laws, used to control the nation's
borders, and the expansive civil rights laws, utilized within U.S.
borders to remove discriminatory restrictions on the labor pool.7
The contrasting goals of immigration and civil rights laws are
paralleled by contrasting enforcement mechanisms: immigration
law is largely enforced by public bodies and civil rights by private
actors. The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and its
related agencies, particularly ICE, increases compliance with
immigration laws by penalizing immigration violators. For civil
rights enforcement, the State depends heavily on private actors
to take on the responsibility of "'private attorneys general'-
private individuals who act in the place of the State in order to
increase compliance with antidiscrimination laws."
Undocumented immigrant workers who experience
workplace exploitation are uniquely impacted by the divergent
goals of immigration and civil rights laws. Due to their lack of
regularized immigration status, these workers are the objects of
the public enforcement of immigration laws. ICE raids have torn
families apart, placed both documented and undocumented im-
migrants in detention, and deported many of these workers
without meaningful judicial review.9 The federal government's
6 Id.
7 Juliet Stumpf and Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration
Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 131 (2002-2003)
(discussing how immigration law that is designed to reduce the impact of illegal immigra-
tion on the domestic labor market may simultaneously negatively impact immigrants
both within and outside of the current domestic labor market).
8 Id at 135 (comparing the enforcement of immigration law by the state, on the one
hand, with private attorneys general, created by several recently-enacted civil rights
statutes, on the other).
9 Over-Raided, Under Siege: U.S. Immigration Laws and Enforcement Destroy the
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plenary power over immigration regulation provides the harsh
justification for depriving immigrants of basic procedural due
process rights against deportation. 10 And while a new adminis-
tration claims a reduction in high visibility raids, longstanding
immigration policy aims to remove undocumented immigrants
and the government continues to focus immigration enforcement
efforts on the workplace through audits of employers suspected
of hiring unauthorized workers.1 Inevitably, these investigations
will lead to the same result, the arrest and deportation of undo-
cumented immigrants who may be victims of workplace civil
rights violations. 12
Yet, regardless of whether workers are foreign-born, the
substantive guarantees of our civil rights laws are expansive
enough to extend to the workplace and to protect all workers
against exploitation. The Thirteenth Amendment guarantees
freedom from slavery and involuntary servitude,' 3 the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides all indi-
viduals with equal protection of the laws,' 4 and various civil
rights statutes, most prominently the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
prohibit discrimination in a variety of settings. 15
Rights of Immigrants, National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights 1-46 (Jan
2008), available at <http://www.nnirr.org/resources/docs[UnderSiege-web2.pdf> (last
visited July 9, 2009) (detailing violations of immigrants' human rights by federal and
state governments, private employers, and citizen enforcement groups and recommending
policy changes to prevent further violations).
10 See, for example, Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 603, 608 (1889)
(holding that "the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory" and that "[t]he power of exclusion of
foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United
States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its
exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the coun-
try require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one").
I1 Anna Gorman, L.A. Employers Face Immigration Audits, L.A. Times (July 2, 2009)
available at <http://www.latimes.com/newslocallla-me-immigemploy2-2009jul02,0,
7434438.story?track=rss> (last visited July 9, 2009).
12 ICE Fact Sheet (April 30, 2009) available at <http://www.ice.gov/pilnews/
factsheets/worksite.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009) (indicating that "ICE will continue to
arrest and process for removal any illegal workers who are found in the course of these
worksite enforcement actions").
13 US Const Amend XIII, §§ 1-2 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime where of the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have
the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
14 US Const Amend XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
15 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42
USC § 2000a et seq (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in "public accommodations").
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Violations of these rights injure not only the direct victims of
the unlawful workplace practices, but also the national commu-
nity at large, the norms of which inform the conduct that Con-
gress wishes to proscribe. Hence, many civil rights statutes grant
victims of civil rights violations private rights of action against
their perpetrators in order to achieve individual relief as well as
"to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that can-
not be valued solely in monetary terms."'16 In acting as a private
attorney general, "a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures
important social benefits .... [W]hen his day in court is denied
him, the congressional policy which a civil rights plaintiff seeks
to assert and vindicate goes unvindicated and the entire nation,
not just the individual citizen suffers." 17
In theory, undocumented workers victimized by exploitive
employment practices may act as private attorneys general in
the enforcement of workplace harms and may sue their employ-
ers under many of the same civil rights laws that protect citizen
workers.18 Yet, in practice, the goals of immigration enforcement
largely take precedence over the individual rights of undocu-
mented workers. When these workers are deported and deprived
of access to civil courts, workplace violations are not prosecuted
and as a result basic workplace protections are undermined.
Consequently, both the workers and the nation suffer deteriora-
tion in civil rights.
This Article seeks to transform this reality into one that pri-
oritizes the civil workplace rights of undocumented immigrants
over the goals of immigration enforcement by placing primacy on
the role of the immigrant undocumented worker as a private at-
torney general. In developing this theory, this Article borrows
from the legal framework addressing human trafficking where
the divergent goals of immigration law and civil rights law are
ameliorated. In this context, undocumented workers forced to
16 City of Riverside v Rivera, 477 US 561, 575 (1986) (affirming an attorney fee award
to a civil rights plaintiff under 42 USC § 1988 in excess of the amount of damages recov-
ered by plaintiffs).
17 Pamela Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U III L Rev 183, 187
(citing City of Riverside v Rivera, 477 US at 575).
18 Linda Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocu-
mented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis L Rev 955, 1006-40 (describing the
ways in which the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) highlighted the
tension between the undocumented workers as outsiders and as members of the national
community, and arguing that IRCA will have a negative impact on undocumented work-
ers).
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labor in exploitive conditions may sue their traffickers 19 and may
also obtain immigration status 20 pursuant to the Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act ("TVPA").21
Congress passed the TVPA in 2000, 22 to combat comprehen-
sively the phenomenon of trafficking in persons, which broadly
encompasses the recruitment and transportation of workers,
mostly immigrants, into a wide array of industries through the
use of force, fraud, or coercion. As indicated in the law's purposes
and findings, human trafficking involves significant labor viola-
tions and is an international phenomenon implicating both for-
eign commerce and the "nationwide employment network and
labor market."23 The TVPA has a strong prosecutorial purpose
and is designed to criminalize traffickers. Yet, it also protects a
previously unrecognized class of undocumented workers by pro-
viding legal immigration status, realizing that trafficking victims
are "often illegal immigrants in the destination country [and] are
repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers them-
selves." 24 In 2003, the TVPA was amended to include a private
right of action thereby codifying a new class of private attorneys
general and representing an effort to extend civil rights protec-
tions to trafficked persons. 25 In 2008, the TVPA's civil remedy
was expanded to cover a wider range of defendants and prohi-
bited conduct. 26 Significantly, the 2008 amendments also grant
"continued presence," a form of temporary immigration status to
trafficked persons who pursue civil suits against their traffick-
ers. Thus, as private attorneys general, who may secure immi-
gration status, trafficked plaintiffs represent a class of immi-
grant workers who are not merely objects of immigration en-
19 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub L No 108-193,
§ 1595, 117 Stat 2875, 2878 (2003), codified as amended at scattered sections of titles 8,
18, 22, 42 (2006) (amending the TVPA as discussed below and appropriating funds for the
TVPA for 2004 and 2005).
20 22 USC § 7101(b)(17) (2006).
21 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub L No 106-386, 114
Stat 1464, codified as amended at scattered sections of titles 18, 22, 27, 42 (2000) (de-
scribing the purpose of the Act as "combat[ing] trafficking in persons, especially into the
sex trade, slavery, and involuntary servitude").
22 Id.
23 22 USC § 7101(b)(12) (2006).
24 22 USC § 7101(b)(17) (2006).
25 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, 117 Stat at 2878.
26 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub L 110-457, 122 Stat 5044, codified at scattered sections in titles 6, 8, 18, 22, 28, 42
USC (2008) (describing the purpose of the Act as "[tlo authorize appropriations for fiscal
years 2008 through 2011 for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 [and] to en-
hance measures to combat trafficking in persons").
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forcement, but who are agents of enforcement of civil rights vi-
olations in the workplace.
This Article draws from the trafficking framework to propose
a private attorney general model of workplace regulation for all
undocumented workers victimized by labor exploitation. This
Article is part of a larger project examining the substantive
rights of undocumented immigrants. In a companion piece, 27 I
critique the law's distinction between immigrant labor exploita-
tion and human trafficking by exploring theories of coerced labor.
The latter receives the law's protection as victims of involuntary
servitude, while the former does not, since undocumented work-
ers are perceived to be in a collusive relationship with their em-
ployers, freely complying with substandard working conditions
and voluntarily present without legal status. I argue that the
conceptual distinction between trafficked workers and immigrant
victims of labor exploitation, if any, is ambiguous. In varying de-
grees, both are subjected to substandard working conditions and
both may undergo coercion in the workplace that contributes to
their compliance. In this Article, however, I acknowledge that in
practice, the law continues to be implemented in a manner that
distinguishes between trafficked workers and other immigrant
victims of labor exploitation. I therefore explore the extent to
which a trafficking victim's civil rights regime can be imported
into the undocumented worker context.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I provides a
background on the development of the private attorney general
and its traditional role in the enforcement of civil rights. Part I
also describes the limited efficacy of the private attorney general
in the undocumented worker context, where the goals of immi-
gration enforcement supersede those of civil rights enforcement.
Part II discusses human trafficking as a phenomenon of
global labor migration that violates the civil rights of immigrant
workers to be free from coercive and exploitive work environ-
ments. Part II describes the human trafficking laws, focusing on
the TVPA's private right of action, its recent expansion, and the
immigration relief available which empowers trafficked plaintiffs
to fulfill their roles as private attorneys general without risk of
deportation.
Part III examines civil litigation on behalf of human traffick-
ing victims, which incorporates the TVPA as well as the Thir-
teenth Amendment and other civil rights statutes. This Part de-
27 Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, forthcoming 2010.
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scribes the ways in which the trafficked plaintiff fulfills the role
of private attorney general not only by obtaining individual re-
lief, but also by vindicating important societal interests in the
advancement of constitutional and civil rights. A parallel analy-
sis of litigation in the'undocumented worker context .demon-
strates similar individual and social benefits. This comparative
analysis supports an additional policy objective: The trafficked
worker as private attorney general represents a model of civil
rights enforcement. If replicated by other undocumented victims
of workplace abuse, this model would allow these victims, unim-
peded by restrictive immigration laws, to advance civil rights
imperatives.
PART I
A. Civil Rights and the Private Attorney General
Private attorneys general may be created by statute, judicial
decision, or executive order.28 The basic premise of the private
attorney general is that, by empowering private persons with
causes of action to sue for their injuries, the individual not only
obtains direct relief, but also accomplishes important public poli-
cy goals.29 Interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme
Court declared that when a plaintiff brings an action and obtains
relief "he does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private at-
torney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of
the highest priority."30 In City of Riverside v Rivera,31 the Court
further explained that this public policy goal is realized even
when the private attorney general obtains individual compensa-
tory damages rather than injunctive relief: "[U]nlike most pri-
vate tort litigants, the civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate im-
28 William Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It Mat-
ters, 57 Vand L Rev 2127, 2130 (2004), providing an overview of the role of the private
attorney general in the United States and drawing on the historical discussion of private
attorneys general in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co v Wilderness Society, 421 US 240, 247-
61 (1975). See also Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 Minn L
Rev 434 (2007) (describing the private attorney general theory and discussing the limits
of private enforcement in the disability context, suggesting a more effective public en-
forcement scheme).
29 Karlan, 2003 U Ill L Rev at 186-87 (cited in note 17) (briefly describing the impor-
tance of the private attorney general as an introduction to a discussion of four recent
Supreme Court cases that sharply limit the power of private attorneys general).
30 Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc, 390 US 400, 402 (1968) (holding that
plaintiffs can usually be awarded attorneys' fees since plaintiffs would otherwise lack the
resources to bring claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
31 477 US 561 (1986).
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portant civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued sole-
ly in monetary terms.... Regardless of the form of relief he ac-
tually obtains, a successful civil rights plaintiff often secures im-
portant social benefits."32
Most civil rights statutes explicitly provide for private attor-
neys general. To encourage individuals injured by civil rights
violations to act as private attorneys general, a prevailing plain-
tiff typically may recover attorneys' fees. This added incentive
indicates congressional recognition that public enforcement alone
may be insufficient to increase compliance with civil rights stan-
dards. This important role of the private attorney general has
been recognized by the Supreme Court. In Allen v State Board of
Elections,33 the Court affirmed the private cause of action under
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by noting that the guaran-
tees of the Fifteenth Amendment would be "severely hampered
... if each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation
instituted at the discretion of the Attorney General.... The At-
torney General has limited staff and often might be unable to
uncover quickly new regulations and enactments passed at the
varying levels of state government."34 The consequence of de-
pending solely on governmental action is fewer enforcement ac-
tions, a reduction in compliance with civil rights regulations, and
more rights violations.
Thus, the broad policy goals of promoting civil rights are pri-
oritized over governmental discretionary measures through the
private attorney general. 35 By explicating and giving force "to the
values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution
and statutes,"36 the private attorney general lawsuit elevates the
significance of the litigation itself:
32 Id at 574 (distinguishing civil rights actions from private tort suits).
33 393 US 544 (1969).
34 Id at 556 (reasoning that actions by private citizens are necessary to achieve the
purposes of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and holding that private citizens can invoke the
jurisdiction of the district court under the VRA).
35 Karlan, 2003 U Ill L Rev at 200 (cited in note 17) (citation omitted) (contrasting
the purpose of § 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows federal agencies to "ef-
fectuate" the goals of the Act by promulgating rules and regulations, with the purposes of
private attorneys general). According to Karlan, the private attorney general "elevates
full enforcement of broad policy goals over formal political accountability for discrete
enforcement decisions," thereby more effectively promoting constitutional and civil rights
standards. Id. But see Waterstone, 92 Minn L Rev at 436-37 (cited in note 28) (arguing
for greater public enforcement of civil rights harms in the disability context given the
recent cutting back of private attorney general lawsuits by the Supreme Court).
36 Karlan, 2003 U Ill L Rev at 201 (cited in note 17).
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[The private attorney general] vindicates the public inter-
est by bringing that defendant into compliance with con-
stitutional standards or statutory commands... [and] if a
private attorney general obtains a judgment in her favor,
that judgment will often be accompanied by a judicial de-
cision that articulates a rationale for her victory that ex-
tends beyond her particular case. The creation of binding
precedents is a beneficial byproduct of litigation ...37
Such binding precedents have been important in advancing
civil rights in the workplace. For example, in Griggs v Duke Pow-
er Co, 38 the Supreme Court extended Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act to prohibit employer conduct that has a discriminato-
ry impact on minorities and women. 39 In Meritor Savings Bank v
Vinson,40 the Court established sexual harassment as a form of
unlawful job discrimination under Title VII and broadly defined
sexual harassment as including an abusive or hostile work envi-
ronment.41
Other federal employment and labor statutes provide broad
protections against discrimination and other types of workplace
exploitation such as wage and hour violations and employer re-
taliation for worker organizing activity. 42 The last of the New
Deal legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), was
37 Id (contrasting the rather narrow vision of litigation described in Marbury v Madi-
son, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803), with the more expansive vision embodied in the
private attorney general).
38 401 US 424 (1971).
39 Id at 436 ("What Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms
controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified
simply because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Con-
gress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationali-
ty, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that any tests used
must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.").
40 477 US 57 (1986).
41 Id at 66 (holding that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving
that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment").
Although Title VII may be enforced through the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC"), Title VII provides for a private right of action when the EEOC chooses
not to pursue a Title VII complaint. The availability of the private right of action enables
private litigants to sue for Title VII violations when governmental discretion prevents
EEOC enforcement.
42 The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") protects workers who organize from
adverse employment actions. 29 USC §§ 151-169 (2006). Workers may utilize the NLRA
to bring direct causes of action against employers who retaliate for a worker's organizing
activity. However, recovery for undocumented workers under the NLRA has been greatly
limited by the Supreme Court decision in Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v NLRB, 535
U.S. 137 (2002). Section C below discusses the NLRA and Hoffman in greater detail.
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signed into law in 1938 at the height of the Great Depression. 43
Its intent was to promote the protection of workers and economic
fair play between employers and employees.4 4 Like most civil
rights statutes, the FLSA was enacted pursuant to Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress
to regulate any activity related to interstate commerce. 45 Yet, the
FLSA represented much more than commerce regulation. Its
congressional history demonstrates that the FLSA embodied
substantive constitutional values, specifically, the free and fair
labor constitutional guarantee of the Thirteenth Amendment,
which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude.4 6
The FLSA requires that workers receive a minimum wage
and overtime pay. It also protects them against unfair labor
practices.4 7 While it created a Wage and Hour Division in the
Department of Labor ("DOL") to enforce these new standards,
workers who experience violations of the Act are also empowered
to sue directly for damages and attorneys' fees. 48 Given the his-
torically understaffed and underfunded resources of the DOL,49
enforcement of FLSA's standards is necessarily reliant on private
43 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub L No 75-718, 52 Stat 1060, codified at 29
USC § 201 et seq (2000).
44 Id ('The Congress hereby finds that: the existence, in industries engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods or commerce of labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general wellbeing of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities
of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the work-
ers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;
(3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5)
interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce. It is hereby declared
to be the policy of this Act, through, the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate
commerce among the several States, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate
the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially curtailing em-
ployment or earning power.").
45 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3 ('The Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several states.").
46 See generally, James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce
Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 Colum L
Rev 1 (2002). See also Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, 138 U Pa L Rev 437, 438 (1989-1990) (finding evidence in the congressional record
and the history of the Thirteenth Amendment, that the FLSA stood for "a much broader
idea of employee autonomy and independence"); James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of
Freedom, 106 Yale L J 941 (1996-1997).
47 29 USC §§ 206 (2006) (mandating a minimum wage) and 207 (establishing over-
time pay).
48 29 USC §§ 204(a) (2006) (establishing the Wage and Hour Division) and 216(b)
(allowing employees to sue directly).
49 Robert J.S. Ross, Slaves to Fashion: Poverty and Abuse in the New Sweatshops
150-52 (Michigan 2004).
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plaintiffs' actions. Additionally, the FLSA specifies a procedure
for collective actions, allowing injured plaintiffs to sue on behalf
of themselves as well as "other employees similarly situated."50
FLSA's collective requirements are less onerous51 than Rule 23
class actions, in which plaintiffs must prove typicality, commo-
nality, numerosity and adequacy of representation to receive
class certification.5 2 Furthermore, while Legal Services Corpora-
tions are prohibited from bringing class actions, they are permit-
ted to bring collective actions.53 This indicates that Congress in-
tended to give FLSA protections to a wide range of plaintiffs. The
inclusion of private lawsuits for FLSA enforcement conserves
public resources and also amplifies the voices of workers by al-
lowing them to direct their own lawsuit.
B. Civil Rights and the Undocumented Worker
This combination of anti-discrimination and fair labor pro-
tections under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the FLSA provide
workers with direct causes of action to protect both themselves
and workers similarly situated from exploitation, while also
promoting the policy goals of free labor and equal protection de-
rived from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
extension of these rights to immigrants-both lawfully and un-
lawfully present in the United States-indicates that these
rights exist independently of citizenship-based rights.54 However,
50 29 USC § 216(b) (2006).
51 See 29 USC § 216(b) ("An action to recover [unpaid overtime] may be maintained
against any employer ... in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any
one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated."). See also Wage & Hour: As Overtime Lawsuits Renew FLSA Debate,
Attorneys Advise Learning the Wage Law, Daily Labor Rptr (BNA June 25, 2002); Dis-
crimination: Wage Hour Collective Actions Jumped 70 Percent Since 2000, Analysis
Shows, Daily Labor Rptr (BNA Mar 26, 2004).
52 FRCP 23 (providing the rules for class action certification). The class action law-
suit traditionally has epitomized the private attorney general action. The comparison
between FLSA collective actions and class actions is not intended to criticize the efficacy
of the class action as a significant civil rights tool. The comparison is intended to high-
light the purpose of the FLSA to promote broad worker protections.
53 Legal Services Corporation Regulations, 45 CFR Part §§ 1617.1-1617.4 (1996)-
Class Actions, available at <http://www.lsc.gov/lscgov4/45cfr1617.PDF> (prohibiting class
actions, but not providing the same prohibition on FLSA collective actions) (last visited
July 9, 2009).
54 See, for example, Espinoza v Farah Manufacturing Co, 414 US 86 (1973) (holding
that undocumented workers are included within the meaning of "employee" under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). See also Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 213-15 (1982)
(holding that the undocumented immigrant "is subject to the full range of obligations
imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction-
either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the
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in practice, there is often a strained relationship between immi-
gration policy and civil rights. The constant threat of deportation
alienates workers with precarious immigration status from
access to justice for workplace violations. 55 Undocumented work-
ers who complain about working conditions are met with retalia-
tion by employers reporting the workers to immigration authori-
ties.56 Employer retaliation, while prohibited as a policy matter,
may still provide a legitimate basis for removal.57 This reality
reduces employer accountability for workplace violations against
undocumented immigrants, thereby producing additional incen-
tives for unscrupulous employers to employ and to exploit an un-
documented workforce. 58
United States-he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose
to establish."); In re Reyes, 814 F2d 168, 170 (5th Cir 1987) ("[Tjhe protections of the Fair
Labor Standards Act are applicable to citizens and aliens alike and whether the alien is
documented or undocumented is irrelevant."). See generally EEOC: Undocumented Work-
ers Entitled To Same Remedies As Authorized Workers, 13 Immigrants' Rights Update 7
(Natl Immigration L Center Nov 17, 1999), available at <http://www.nilc.org
immsemplymnt/emprights/emprights008.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
55 See Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of
Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 Harv CR-CL L Rev 345, 360 (Summer
2001) (describing the relationship between the INS and employers of undocumented
workers as establishing "cooperative industry-wide approaches" for immigration sanc-
tions and concluding that these "workplace strategies ... focus not on the border but on
creating an unemployed underclass within our borders, often inflicting economic harm on
employers and draining community resources. The unemployed, nondeported, discharged
workers remain a part of our society, and are pushed further underground, where they
are that much more vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous employers seeking to
circumvent labor laws.").
56 Rivera v Nibco, Inc, 364 F3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir 2004) ("While documented work-
ers face the possibility of retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil
rights, undocumented workers confront the harsher reality that, in addition to possible
discharge, their employer will likely report them to the INS and they will be subjected to
deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution."). See also Singh v Jutla & C.D. & R's
Oil, Inc, 214 F Supp 2d 1056, 1059-62 (N D Cal 2002) (denying defendant employer's
motion to dismiss where plaintiff undocumented alien employee stated a claim for retalia-
tory reporting under the FLSA); Contreras v Corinthian Vigor Ins Brokerage, Inc, 25 F
Supp 2d 1053, 1059-60 (N D Cal 1998) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss where
plaintiff employee sought punitive damages and alleged that her employer violated FLSA
by reporting her to the INS in retaliation for her suit to collect unpaid wages); 8 USC
§ 1227(a)(1)(B) (Supp V 2006) (making individuals who are present in the United States
without lawful status deportable).
57 See, for example, Montero v INS, 124 F3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir 1997) (reasoning
that "[w]hether or not an undocumented alien has been the victim of unfair labor practic-
es, such an alien has no entitlement to be in the United States," and holding that infor-
mation about immigration status from employers in violation of labor laws can form a
basis for deportation). See also Nessel, 36 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 361 (cited in note 55)
("[T]he only workers at risk of deportation for unauthorized employment are those re-
ported by the employer in retaliation for protected organizing activities or 'that kind of
stuff."').
58 See Christopher Ho and Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plas-
tic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the
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As a result of this reduction in employer accountability, un-
documented workers typically experience a greater number of
unlawful working conditions, such as substandard wages, over-
time violations, and health and safety violations. 59 While there is
little comprehensive national data, due to the clandestine nature
of undocumented workers' employment, one report found a 22
percent general wage penalty for being undocumented, control-
ling for length of U.S. work experience, education, English profi-
ciency, and occupation. 60 Other region and industry specific re-
search provides a broader picture of the general working condi-
tions of undocumented immigrants. For example, a study on Chi-
cago's undocumented immigrant population revealed that 26
percent of undocumented workers received no payment or un-
derpayment of wages6 1 and while many of these workers reported
unsafe work conditions,62 they were significantly underrepre-
sented in filing claims with OSHA. Their reasons for not report-
ing safety issues to OSHA included the belief that OSHA would
not do anything, fear of employer retaliation and fear of deporta-
tion.63 The day laborer population, 75 percent of which is undoc-
umented, also face employment abuses.6 4 Almost half of this
population experiences wage theft65 and denial of food and water
while on the job.66 Many of these workers are verbally and phys-
Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 Hofstra Lab & Emp L J 473, 477 (2004-2005) ("[The
conditions under which these persons work are-owing to their precarious circums-
tances-typically substandard, rife with exploitation by avaricious employers and, some-
times, astoundingly appalling in the extent and depth of their cruelty.").
59 See, for example, Annette Bernhardt, Siobhdn McGrath, and James DeFilippis,
Report: Unregulated Work in the Global City: Employment and Labor Law Violations in
New York City (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School 2007), available at
<http://nelp.3cdn.net/cc4d6le5942f9cfdc5_d6m6bgaq4.pdf> (researching unregulated
industries and labor violations in New York City and focusing on the immigrant work-
force) (last visited July 9, 2009).
60 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, et al, Migration Policy Institute, Observations on
Regularization and the Labor Performance of Unauthorized and Regularized Immigrants
14 (2004), available at <http://ec.europa.eulemployment-social/employment-analysis/
docs/regularisation5.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
61 Chirag Mehta, et al, Chicago's Undocumented Immigrants: An Analysis Of Wages,
Working Conditions, and Economic Contributions 29 (University of Illinois, Center For
Urban Economic Development Feb 2002), available at <http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/uicued/
npublicationslrecentlundoc full.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
62 Id at 27.
63 Mehta, Chicago's Undocumented Immigrants at 29 (cited in note 61).
64 Abel Valenzuela Jr., et al, On the Corner: Day Labor in the United States 17
(UCLA Center For the Study of Urban Poverty Jan 2006), available at <http://www.
sscnet.ucla.edu/issr/csup/uploaded-files/NatlDayLabor-On the Cornerl.pdf> (last vi-
sited July 9, 2009).
65 Id at 14, table 7.
66 Id.
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ically harassed by their employers and threatened with deporta-
tion. 67
High concentrations of undocumented workers also exist in
meat and poultry processing plants, which are notorious for per-
vasive employment abuses.68 In a multi-part series uncovering
worker exploitation at poultry processing plants in the Carolinas,
the Charlotte Observer estimated that 80 to 90 percent of the
workers at these plants were Latino and that most were undoc-
umented.6 9 Former supervisors at a plant stated that the plant
preferred undocumented workers because they were "less likely
to question working conditions for fear of losing their jobs or be-
ing deported." 70 The goal of worker compliance is unsurprising
given the harsh and dangerous working conditions. The poultry
processing industry's death and injury rates are higher than
those for manufacturing as a whole. Over the last decade, more
than three-hundred thousand workers have been injured and
approximately one hundred poultry workers have died on the
job.71 In spite of these dangers, these factories continuously vio-
late basic wage and hour laws. For example, a DOL report found
that virtually all poultry plants were non-compliant with wage
and hour laws. 72 Human Rights Watch determined that govern-
mental agencies failed to prosecute basic labor rights violations
against the immigrant workers at these factories and further
concluded that "[f]ederal law and policy on immigrant workers
67 Id.
68 Lance Compa, Blood, Sweat and Fear: Workers Rights in U.S. Meat and Poultry
Plants (Human Rights Watch 2004). See also Franco Ordonez, Kerry Hall, and Ames
Alexander, Misery on the Line: Some Managers Knew Workers Were Illegal, Former Em-
ployees Say, Charlotte Observer (Sept 30, 2008), available at <http://www.
charlotteobserver.com/595/story/223444.html> (last visited July 9, 2009). ("One 2006
study estimated more than a quarter of meat-processing workers nationwide are undo-
cumented. Some experts say even more work in poultry because its jobs are less skilled.").
69 See generally The Cruelest Cuts Series: The Human Cost of Bringing Poultry to
Your Table, Charlotte Observer (Feb 10-15, 2008), available at <http://www.
charlotteobserver.com/poultry> (last visited July 9, 2009). See also Rick Thames, Poultry
Series Exposes a New, Silent Subclass, Charlotte Observer (Sept 30, 2008), available at
<http://www.charlotteobserver.conm595/story/223508.html> (last visited July 9, 2009).
70 Ordonez, Hall, and Ames, Misery on the Line, Charlotte Observer (cited in note 68).
71 The Perils of Processing, Charlotte Observer (Sept 30, 2008), available at
<http://www.charlotteobserver.com/595/story/223426.html> (last visited July 9, 2009).
72 US Department of Labor, Fiscal Year 2000 Poultry Processing Compliance Report 3
(2000). See also US Department of Labor, Poultry Processing Compliance Survey Fact
Sheet (Jan 20, 2001), available at <http://www.ufcw.orgtdocUploadsfUsdept-I.pdf
?CFID=7005606&CFTOKEN=63042914> (last visited July 9, 2009) (describing additional
statistical data on the working conditions at poultry processing plants).
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are a mass of contradictions; at worst they contain incentives for
employers to violate their rights."73
Egregious working conditions are not limited to the undoc-
umented workforce. Rampant abuses against temporary workers
have also been documented.74 In particular, the H-2A nonimmi-
grant visa program has been characterized as akin to slavery
because workers are especially vulnerable to employment abuses
due to the restrictive terms of their visa status. 75 Moreover, dis-
crimination against immigrants, even those who have legal per-
manent residency, seems to have an overall impact on working
conditions.76
Notwithstanding the difficult issues facing legal immigrant
workers in this country, the focus of this Article is undocumented
workers, not only because they aptly illustrate the tension be-
tween the goals of immigration law and civil rights law, but be-
cause they make significant contributions to the U.S. economy
and society that should not be ignored. 77 There are an estimated
twelve million undocumented immigrants currently residing in
the U.S.; these immigrants make up 30 percent of the nation's
foreign-born population 78 and 5 percent of the nation's labor
73 Compa, Blood, Sweat, And Fear at 4 (cited in note 68).
74 Hidden in the Home: Abuse of Domestic Workers with Special Visas in the US
(Human Rights Watch 2001); Mary Bauer, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the
United States (Southern Poverty Law Center Feb 2007), available at <http://www.
splcenter.org/pdf/static/SPLCguestworker.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009); Litany of
Abuses: More-Not Fewer-Labor Protections Needed in the H-2A Guestworker Program
(Farmworker Justice Dec 2008), available at <http://www.fwjustice.org/Immigration-
Labor/H2abDocs/LitanyofAbuseReportl2-09-08.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
75 Bauer, Close to Slavery at 2 (cited in note 74); Litany of Abuses at 6-9 (cited in note
74).
76 See Roger Waldinger and Michael I. Lichter, How the Other Half Works: Immigra-
tion and the Social Organization of Labor 141-80 (California 2003). See also Leticia M.
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and the Making of the
Brown Collar Workplace, 67 Ohio St L J 961, 962 (2006) (arguing that the "brown collar
[Latino] labor pool is presumed to be undocumented," and low-wage Latino workers face
negative employment treatment "regardless of documentation status"); Lora Jo Foo, The
Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker
Protective Legislation, 103 Yale L J 2179, 2183 (1993-1994).
77 Assessing the Economic Impact of Immigration at the State and Local Level (Immi-
gration Policy Center Apr 28, 2009), available at <http://www.immigrationpolicy.org
images/File/factcheck/State%20and%2OLocal%20Study%20Survey%2004-27-09.pdf> (last
visited July 9, 2009).
78 Jeffrey Passel and D'Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the
United States at 2, 3 (Pew Hispanic Center Apr 14, 2009), available at
<http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009). See also Jeffrey
Passel and D'Vera Cohn, Trends in Unauthorized Immigration: Undocumented Inflow
Now Trails Legal Inflow (Pew Hispanic Center Oct 2, 2008), available at
<http://pewhispanic.orgtfiles/reports/94.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
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force. 79 Industries such as agriculture, cleaning, construction and
hospitality heavily depend on these workers. 80 In addition to fill-
ing jobs, undocumented workers support the U.S. economy as
consumers and taxpayers of state and local sales taxes, real es-
tate taxes, and income tax.81 Because they are ineligible for al-
most all government public assistance programs, their net con-
tribution exceeds their cost to the economy.82 A 2008 report found
that "the immediate effect of eliminating the undocumented
workforce would include an estimated $1.757 trillion in annual
lost spending, $651.511 billion in annual lost output, and 8.1 mil-
lion job losses."83
As Professor Jennifer Gordon has stated, one basic norma-
tive argument for recognizing the rights of undocumented work-
ers is "about human dignity: if you give up your labour, you're
benefiting the country that you're in, so you deserve to be treated
with respect and paid fairly. '84 Professor Alexandra Natapoff has
discussed the exploitation of undocumented workers within the
general context of under-enforcement of violations against mar-
ginalized groups to suggest a deeper problem presented to liberal
democracies:
When underenforcement affects socially vulnerable
groups, fairness concerns are at their height. It also be-
79 An Essential Resource: An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Undocumented
Workers on Business Activity in the U.S. with Estimated Effects by State and by Industry
(The Perryman Group Apr 2008), available at <http://www.ilw.com/articles/2008,1008-
perryman.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
80 Jeffrey Passel, Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics, Background
Briefing Prepared for Task Force on Immigration and America's Future 27 (Pew Hispanic
Center June 14, 2005), available at <http:/pewhispanic.orgfilesreports146.pdf> (last
visited July 9, 2009; see also Passel and Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in
the United States at 16 (cited in note 78).
81 An Essential Resource at 35 (cited in note 79) ("50% and 75% of undocumented
immigrants pay federal, state, and local taxes. Furthermore, their Social Security and
Medicare contributions directly support older Americans as undocumented immigrants
are not eligible to receive these services. Available evidence suggests that undocumented
workers pay far more in overall taxes than they receive in benefits from various govern-
ments.").
82 Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security with Billions,
NY Times Al (Apr 5, 2005).
83 An Essential Resource at 40 (cited in note 79).
84 Peter Costantini, Rights: Anti-Immigrant Surge Tramples Intl Norms, Inter Press
Service News Agency (Dec 9, 2007), available at <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.
asp?idnews=40398> (last visited July 9, 2009). See also Jennifer Gordon, Transnational
Labor Citizenship, 80 S CalL R 503, 511 (2006-2007) ("[Tlhe effort to build labor citizen-
ship is at once an effort to create a strong democratic internal culture, and to exercise
power in the workplace, the community, and the political arena in order to achieve recog-
nition of and compensation for workers' economic contributions to society!.'
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comes a strong form of inegalitarian redistribution as
public resources are channeled away from impoverished
and politically weak groups or communities.... When
this responsiveness failure leads in turn to the inegalitar-
ian distribution of one of society's most valuable re-
sources-the protection of the law itself-this is a harm of
significant democratic proportions.8 5
The under-enforcement of violations against undocumented
workers deprives these workers of individual relief and also
threatens to harm the bedrocks of our nation's civil and constitu-
tional obligations to protect freedom and equality.
C. Immigration Law and the Undocumented Worker
Immigration law has also been traditionally under-enforced,
particularly in the workplace.8 6 Previous to the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), "federal
law permitted employers to hire undocumented immigrants."87
With the objective to eliminate unauthorized migration, thought
to be driven largely by employment opportunities in the U.S.,
Congress passed IRCA in 1986, reversing this implicit federal
policy by transferring immigration enforcement to the workplace.
Employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens can be sanctioned
under IRCA's immigration regulatory regime.88 Employers must
therefore verify the legal immigration status of their employees
upon hiring. In theory, immigration status verification and the
threat of sanctions provide an incentive to employers to screen
out potential immigration violators as employees,8 9 thereby de-
terring illegal immigration. 90
85 Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 Fordham L Rev 1715, 1753 (2006-
2007).
86 Id at 1736. See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law 108 Colum L
Rev 2037, 2049 (2008) ('The reason is that chronic and intentional underenforcement of
immigration law has been de facto federal policy for over a century.").
87 Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The
Experiment Fails, 2007 U Chi Legal F 193, 193.
88 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Ch 477, §274A(a)(1)(A), 66 Stat 228
(1952), codified as amended by IRCA (1986) at 8 USC § 1324(a) (2006). See also Doris
Meissner and Donald Kerwin, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and Correcting
Course 27 (Migration Policy Institute Feb 2009).
89 See generally Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61
Stan L Rev 1103 (2009).
90 Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Statement: Immigra-
tion Enforcement: Preliminary Observations on Employment Verification and Worksite
Enforcement Efforts at 1 (GAO 2005) ("As we and others have reported in the past, the
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In addition to its enforcement provisions, IRCA implemented
a broad amnesty to certain undocumented immigrants who had
resided continuously in the United States for a number of
years. 91 IRCA also included provisions against national origin
and alienage discrimination to protect lawful workers from ad-
verse employment decisions based on a worker's foreign appear-
ance. 92 However, IRCA did not contemplate substantive civil
rights protections for unlawful workers, since its chief goal was
to bring an end to unauthorized migration.
In the twenty years that followed IRCA's passage, the de-
mand of the U.S. economy has perpetuated the hiring of undo-
cumented labor and "immigration officials openly acknowledge
that they do not enforce [IRCA's] provisions, but rather that the
government 'turns a blind eye' to immigration violations in the
workplace."93 IRCA's enforcement scheme has largely failed at
curbing unauthorized migration-evidenced by the marked in-
crease in the population of undocumented immigrants in the U.S.
and in the labor force in the years following IRCA's passage. 94
Ironically, IRCA has not only been ineffective at accomplishing
its purported goals, but its enforcement framework has also faci-
litated the exploitation of undocumented workers by abusive em-
ployers. According to immigrants' rights scholars, IRCA's em-
ployer sanction and verification provisions empower employers to
act as immigration enforcers by requiring them to investigate the
immigration status of their workers. 95 In turn, IRCA confers "a
opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets attracting illegal aliens
to the United States. To help address this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which made it illegal for individuals and entities to
knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit or refer for a fee unauthorized workers.").
91 INA 245A.
92 INA 274B.
93 Natapoff, 75 Fordham L Rev at 1736 (cited in note 85). See also Stana, Statement:
Immigration Enforcement at 12 (2005) (cited in note 90) ("Worksite enforcement was a
low priority for INS and continues to be a low priority for ICE. In the 1999 INS Interior
Enforcement Strategy, the strategy to block and remove employers' access to undocu-
mented workers was the fifth of five interior enforcement priorities. We have reported
that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS, worksite enforcement received a
small portion of INS's staffing and enforcement budget and that the number of employer
investigations INS conducted each year covered only a fraction of the number of employ-
ers who may have employed unauthorized aliens."); Wishnie, 2007 U Chi Legal F at 209
(cited in note 87) (discussing statistics indicating low government enforcement of IRCA's
employer sanction provisions).
94 Meissner and Kerwin, DHS and Immigration at 28 (cited in note 88). See also
Peter Brownell, The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions (Migration Policy
Institute Sept 1, 2005, available at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/
display.cfm?ID=332> (last visited July 9, 2009).
95 Wishnie, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. at 215 (cited in note 87).
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broad coercive power on employers," which allows them to
threaten workers with the verification of their immigration sta-
tus or reporting workers' unauthorized status to ICE when im-
migrant workers "seek to form a union, demand overtime pay,
resist sexual harassment, or otherwise defend their interests in
the workplace. 96
Furthermore, pursuant to IRCA's prohibition against the
hiring of unauthorized workers, the Supreme Court cemented
the vulnerability of undocumented workers by denying backpay
and reinstatement to an undocumented worker who was wrong-
fully terminated in retaliation for his organizing activity. The
Court prioritized IRCA's immigration enforcement goals over the
rights of the worker, holding that back pay under the NLRA "is
foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Con-
gress in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986."97
Hoffman has had a lasting impact on the immigrant community.
While most remedies for undocumented workers under federal
anti-discrimination laws 98 and FLSA99 remain intact, Hoffman
has chilled immigrant workers, even those with legal status,
from reporting workplace violations for fear of employer reprisals
without a remedy.100
Immigrants' rights advocates uniformly criticize Hoffman
and IRCA's employer sanction regime as allowing employers to
exploit workers with impunity. 10 1 This is not a new phenomenon.
96 Id.
97 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v NLRB, 535 US 137 (2002).
98 Rivera v Nibco, Inc, 364 F3d 1057 (9th Cir 2004) (upholding a protective order
against discovery into a plaintiff's immigration status and finding that even in light of
Hoffman, immigration status is not relevant to determining whether an employer en-
gaged in national origin discrimination under Title VII).
99 Patel v Quality Inn South, 846 F2d 700, 704-05 (11th Cir 1988) ("[Ihe FLSA's
coverage of undocumented aliens ... is [ I fully consistent with the objectives of the
IRCA."). See also Flores v Albertson's, Inc, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 6171, *18-20 (C D Cal);
Liu v Donna Karan Intl, Inc, 207 F Supp 2d 191 (S D NY 2002) (holding that the Hoffman
decision had no bearing on the recovery of backpay for undocumented plaintiffs filing suit
under the FLSA); Singh v Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc, 214 F Supp 2d 1053 (N D Cal
1998).
100 Amy Sugimori, et al, Assessing the Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB on Immigration Workers and Recent Developments
(Natl Employment Law Project and Natl Immigration Law Center), available at
<http://www.nilc.orgtimmsemplymnt/HoffmanNLRB/HoffmanNELPNILCFINAL.PD
F> (last visited July 9, 2009). See also Wishnie, 2007 U Chi Legal F at 213 (cited in note
87) ("[Ihe decision and statute have deterred immigrants from communicating with
labor and employment agencies about unlawful activity they have suffered or wit-
nessed.").
101 Wishnie, 2007 U Chi Legal F at 215 (cited in note 87) (citing a broad consensus of
labor, civil and immigrants rights groups opposed to IRCA's sanctioning regime).
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The history of immigration law and policy as well as its current
developments both created and perpetuated the position of un-
documented immigrants as an underclass in American society.'0 2
As stated by Justice Brennan in Plyler v Doe, which predated
IRCA:
[T]he confluence of Government policies has resulted in
"the existence of a large number of employed illegal aliens
... whose presence is tolerated, whose employment is
perhaps even welcomed, but who are virtually defenseless
against any abuse, exploitation, or callous neglect to
which the state or the state's natural citizens and busi-
ness organizations may wish to subject them."' 10 3
D. Immigration Enforcement and the Subversion of Workplace
Civil Rights
IRCA has failed to curb unauthorized Migration and the hir-
ing of unauthorized immigrant workers, and has exacerbated the
vulnerability of undocumented workers to employer abuse. The
shortcomings of IRCA coupled with post-9/11 anti-terrorism ef-
forts and a newly-invigorated emphasis on the deportation of
"criminal aliens" have fueled political pressure on ICE to expand
its interior enforcement strategy. 104 Through initiatives such as
the National Fugitive Operations Program and Operation Return
to Sender, ICE's internal directives are aimed at "targeting crim-
inal and fugitive aliens; eliminating the magnet of illegal em-
ployment; and dismantling the infrastructure that supports il-
legal immigration including the criminal organizations engaged
102 Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 218-19 (1982) (recognizing the "shadow population of
illegal migrants-numbering in the millions-within our borders" and that they consti-
tute "a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain
here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society
makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an underclass
presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles
of equality under the law").
103 Id. See also Motomura, 108 Colum L Rev at 2054 (cited in note 86) (highlighting
Justice Brennan's statement and noting that "fundamentally, the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Plyler was both perceptive looking back and prescient looking forward. .. "
104 Nina Bernstein, Target of Immigrant Raids Shifted, NY Times Al (Feb 4, 2009),
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O2/04/us/04raids.html> (last visited July 9,
2009) ("[Tjhe memos obtained ... reflected the Bush administration's effort to appear
tough on immigration enforcement ... amid rising anger over illegal immigration.")
(quoting Peter L. Markowitz).
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in wide-spread identity theft and document fraud." 105 ICE has
implemented these initiatives through area sweeps and raids of
homes, communities, and workplaces populated by undocu-
mented immigrants. From January of 2006 through November
2008, approximately three hundred and fifty sweeps and raids
took place throughout the nation.'0 6 Many of these enforcement
actions were implemented pursuant to the National Fugitive Op-
erations Program ("NFOP"), which apprehended more than nine-
ty-six thousand individuals between 2003 and 2008.107 While the
purported goal of the NFOP was to detain and remove dangerous
fugitive aliens-defined as criminal aliens with outstanding
removal orders-approximately three-quarters apprehended
through the program have been non-criminals.1 08
ICE's "multi-faceted" interior enforcement strategy has ex-
tended to the workplace in an effort to "eliminate the magnet of
illegal employment" by giving "teeth" to IRCA and mandating
compliance with employment verification laws.109 Identifying
worksite enforcement as a "crucial facet" of its overall strategy, 1 0
ICE targets organizations that pose national security risks "such
as airports, seaports, nuclear plants, chemical plants and defense
facilities;" worksites that "support illegal immigration" through
utilization of identity theft; document fraud and/or human
smuggling;1 and worksites that rely on unauthorized labor. ICE
claims to focus on criminal and other egregious employers who
exploit their workforce with substandard working conditions and
105 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Multifaceted Strategy Leads to
Record Enforcement-Results Removals, Criminal Arrests, and Worksite Investigations
Soared in Fiscal Year 2008 (Oct 23, 2008), available at <http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/
0810/081023washington.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
106 Comprehensive Documentation of Immigration Enforcement Operations (Centro
Legal, Inc Nov 25, 2008), available at <http://www.centro-legal.org/index.php?
option=com wrapper&Itemid=1l7> (last visited July 9, 2009). See also ICE Raid Map
(Centro Legal, Inc Nov 25, 2008), available at <http://www.centro-legal.org/index.php?
option=comwrapper&Itemid=1ll9> (last visited July 9, 2009).
107 Margot Mendelson, Shayna Strom, and Michael Wishnie, Collateral Damage: An
Examination of ICE's Fugitive Operations Program at 3, 7 (Migration Policy Institute Feb
2009).
108 Id.
109 Meissner and Kerwin, DHS and Immigration at 31-32 (cited in note 88) ("[Olver
the last three years, ICE has carried out a succession of high-profile raids at a variety of
locations against many targets."). See also Comprehensive Documentation of Immigration
Enforcement Operations (cited in note 106).
1o US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Multifaceted Strategy Leads to
Record Enforcement Results (cited in note 105).
II US Department of Homeland Security, Myth vs. Fact: Worksite Enforcement, Lea-
dership Journal Archive (July 9, 2008), available at <http://www.dhs.gov/journal/
leadership/2008/07/myth-vs-fact-worksite-enforcement.html> (last visited July 9, 2009).
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who utilize coercion and threats of deportation "to keep the un-
authorized alien workers from reporting the substandard wage
or working conditions. '" 112 By focusing on unscrupulous employ-
ers who exploit undocumented workers, ICE purports to protect
the workers themselves: "Illegal workers frequently lack the em-
ployment protections afforded those with legal status and are
less likely to report workplace safety violations and other con-
cerns .... ICE's efforts . . . prohibit employers from taking ad-
vantage of illegal workers."1 3
Comporting with ICE's overarching priority to remove crim-
inal aliens, ICE's heightened worksite enforcement has resulted
in the apprehension of some criminal aliens. Criminal arrests
associated with workplace investigations rose from twenty-two in
2002 to eleven hundred in 2008. One hundred thirty-five of those
arrested in 2008 "were business owners, managers, supervisors
or human resource employees."1 14 However, the overwhelming
majority of apprehensions were comprised of administrative vi-
olators, those unlawfully present either because of an expired
visa or because they entered without one. In 2002 "ordinary sta-
tus violators" constituted 485 of the total arrests at worksites. In
2008, this number reached 5,173. Overall, ICE captured 6,273
individuals through workplace raids in 2008. Extrapolating from
ICE's data, over six thousand of these apprehensions were com-
prised of workers and not employers-seemingly contrary to
ICE's policy of "focus[ing] on egregious employers involved in
criminal activity or worker exploitation" and "prohibit[ing] em-
ployers from taking advantage of illegal workers. 1" 5 ICE ex-
plains that the disparity between employer versus employee ar-
rests is due to the small number of top-level managers at the
worksites and the increased complexity of cases against them. 116
Such observations may be true, but still do not adequately
explain ICE's actual practice of arresting non-criminal
employees, which amounted to nearly thirteen thousand between
2006 and 2008.117
112 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement Advisory-
Know Your Workforce, the Key to Immigration Compliance (Mar 25, 2009), available at
<http://www.ice.gov/pi/worksite/index.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
113 Id.
114 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Multifaceted Strategy Leads to
Record Enforcement Results (cited in note 105).
115 Id.
116 US Department of Homeland Security, Myth vs. Fact: Worksite Enforcement (cited
in note 111).
117 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Multifaceted Strategy Leads to
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A report from the Migration Policy Institute confirms that
the workplace raids have had the heaviest impact on the work-
ers, rather than criminal employers: "Although prosecutions con-
tinue, the raids have mostly affected workers, not employers."118
The report further concludes that workplace raids have been an
ineffective strategy at fulfilling ICE's goal to dismantle the crim-
inal infrastructure that facilitates illegal immigration: "Rather
than uprooting human smuggling syndicates, false document
rings, and scofflaw employers, ICE has linked unauthorized em-
ployees to the criminal infrastructure that supports illegal migra-
tion, characterizing the mere use of false documents as identity
theft or aggravated identity theft."119 Overall, ICE's worksite en-
forcement actions have fallen short of its objectives to target
criminal employers and criminal syndicates and to protect vul-
nerable workers from egregious working conditions.
Critiques raised by proponents of immigration reform em-
phasize that ICE executed the raids inhumanely, victimizing un-
documented workers and their families. 20 The raid of Agripro-
cessors in Postville, Iowa invoked particularly serious due
process concerns. Professor Erik Camayd-Freixas's detailed ac-
count of the Agriprocessors raid explains that most of the ar-
rested workers were held on criminal charges of document fraud
and aggravated identity theft and coerced into accepting guilty
pleas and jail time followed by deportation.' 2' The plea agree-
ments were "fast-tracked," depriving the workers of adequate
due process and judicial review. 122 According to Camayd-Freixas,
ICE's actions amounted to "an undemocratic doctrine of expe-
diency, at the core of a police agency, whose power hinges on its
ability to capitalize on public fear."' 23 In the many other
workplace raids that have taken place, thousands of undocu-
mented workers have been arrested for administrative immigra-
tion violations. While not criminally prosecuted, these workers
are nonetheless detained and placed in removal proceedings. The
Record Enforcement Results (cited in note 105).
118 Meissner and Kerwin, DHS and Immigration at 32 (cited in note 88).
119 Id.
120 Over-Raided, Under Siege (cited in note 9). See also Randy Capps, et al, Urban
Institute, Paying the Price: The Impact of Immigration Raids on America's Children at
15-20 (Natl Council of La Raza 2007).
121 Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting the Largest ICE Raid in U.S. History: A Per-
sonal Account at 5 (June 13, 2008), available at <http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images
2008/07/14/opinion/14ed-camayd.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
122 Id at 7-8.
123 Id at 15.
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deportation of these workers has had severe consequences on
their families and the communities in which they reside. For ex-
ample, nearly two-thirds of children who lost their parents
through raids were U.S. citizens. 124 Further, in small cities like
Postville-where the economy depends on the presence of these
workers-the sudden removal of them has had the immediate
effect of leaving "businesses .. . empty" and raising concerns that
the town would be devastated. 125
There are compelling arguments that legitimize the actions
of ICE. The goal of ICE is to enforce compliance with immigra-
tion laws. This goal necessarily encompasses holding liable all
violators of immigration law, including civil violators, such as
undocumented workers. Additionally, ICE is encouraged to fol-
low humanitarian guidelines during the course of a raid. These
guidelines include considering the availability of immigration
relief for certain eligible undocumented individuals and the im-
pact on children dependent on detained undocumented par-
ents. 126 As a result, some undocumented individuals arrested
during raids have been released on humanitarian grounds while
pending removal proceedings. Some members of the public also
believe that ICE raids are a proper implementation of a govern-
mental policy that prohibits the unlawful presence of undocu-
mented workers. Furthermore, many believe that undocumented
workers take away jobs from U.S. based workers and depress the
wages and working conditions in certain low-wage industries.
Finally, ICE raids may have the effect of putting out of business
unscrupulous employers engaged in criminal activity and worker
exploitation.
While both critics and supporters of the raids are important
to acknowledge, the broad debate over the general merits of im-
migration enforcement practices and whether the U.S. should
adopt a stricter or a more liberal immigration policy is beyond
the scope of this Article. Rather, as previously stated, the prima-
ry concern for this Article is the impact of ICE's worksite en-
124 Capps et al, Paying the Price at 15-20 (cited in note 120).
125 Stephen Lendman, Targeting Immigrants-The Largest Ever U.S. ICE Raid (Glob-
al Research Aug 11, 2008), available at <www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?
articleld=9792> (last visited July 9, 2009).
126 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Guidelines for Identifying Humanita-
rian Concerns among Administrative Arrestees When Conducting Worksite Enforcement
Operations, (Nov 2007), available at <http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/wkplce_
enfrcmntlice-hum-guidelines.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
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forcement on the civil workplace rights of undocumented immi-
grants whose labor is exploited by their employers.
Indeed, in the aftermath of the raids, numerous employment
abuses have been uncovered and the undocumented workers in-
jured by these abuses have been prevented from enforcing their
civil rights against these harms. For example, an ICE warrant
for the Agriprocessors raid states that a witness observed a "floor
supervisor blindfolded an immigrant with duct-tape" and then
"took one of the meat hooks and hit the Guatemalan with it."127
According to an attorney who interviewed some of the detained
Agriprocessors' workers, the company consistently underpaid the
workers claiming that the workers owed debts of immigration
fees. 128 The company also denied the workers breaks and prohi-
bited them from using restrooms during ten-hour shifts.1 29 Work-
ers reported physical abuse and female workers reported sexual
abuse by company supervisors. 130 Agriprocessors also allegedly
violated numerous child labor laws by forcing under-age em-
ployees to labor up to seventeen hours per day in prohibited oc-
cupations and under dangerous conditions.1 31 A New York Times
article stated that the child labor violations may be investigated
by government officials; however, there is no indication that the
other reported abuses will be investigated. Moreover, the work-
ers themselves face deportation, and therefore are unable to
access civil justice for the alleged workplace exploitation they
may have suffered.' 32
In a similar scenario, in June 2007, ICE raided three Fresh
Del Monte Produce plants in Portland, Oregon,1 33 taking into
custody one hundred sixty-seven workers for the administrative
violation of unlawful presence.1 34 After the raid, it was revealed
that the "Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division had
opened two separate investigations into safety practices at the
plant."13 5 In retaliation, employers fired the workers who had
127 Preston, After Iowa Raid, NY Times at Al (cited in note 2).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Jennifer Jacobs, Advocates: Workers Allege Sexual Abuse, Des Moines Register 7A
(May 20, 2008).
131 Preston, After Iowa Raid, NY Times at Al (cited in note 2).
132 Id. The article states that the underage workers may attempt to seek U visas.
133 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheets, Worksite Enforcement
(Aug 9, 2007) available at <http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksiteoperations.
htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
134 Id.
135 Giving Workers a Voice, Willamette Faculty (July 1, 2007) available at <http://
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made the complaints. The health and safety violations included
unsanitary living and working conditions on the farms, such as a
lack of bathrooms and drinking water and improper exposure to
pesticides. Complaints to the Oregon Bureau of Labor also re-
vealed minimum wage and overtime violations, unconscionably
long work shifts, and denial of rest breaks. 136 Despite these alle-
gations, "none of the workers detained in the ICE raids were al-
lowed to file or pursue claims against their employer."'137
ICE has conducted enforcement actions at several workplac-
es with ongoing labor disputes.1 38 When workers at the Woodfin
Hotel in Emeryville, California began protesting for a living
wage in compliance with the city's ordinance, the employer reta-
liated by firing twelve workers. The workers organized and con-
tinued to advocate for a living wage. The hotel's management
contacted ICE to investigate the immigration status of the work-
ers. ICE provided the hotel with a list of unauthorized workers
and arrested one undocumented worker.' 39 The raid of Howard
Industries in Mississippi silenced the ongoing labor dispute over
wages and working conditions. 140
The timing of the raids with worker complaints of employ-
ment abuse and organizing activity suggests that employers util-
ize immigration enforcement as a tool to retaliate. A Memoran-
dum of Understanding ("MOU') between the DOL and DHS en-
courages the two agencies to "develop and implement policies...
that avoid inappropriate worksite interventions where it is
known or reasonably suspected that a labor dispute is occurring
and the intervention may, or may be sought so as to, interfere in
the dispute."14' However, implementation of the MOU is discre-
www.willamette.edu/people/archives/2007/07/giving-workers.html> (last visited July 9,
2009).
136 Brent Hunsberger, Previous Coverage: Del Monte Settlement Considered Victory
for Low-wage Workers, The Oregonian (Aug 10, 2006), available at <http://blog.oregon
live.com/oregonianextra/2007/06/past coverage-delmontesettle.html> (last visited July
9, 2009); Brent Hunsberger, Will Del Monte Raid Keep Workers from Reporting Abuses?
The Oregonian (June 14, 2007), available at <http://blog.oregonlive.comIatwork/2007/
06/willraid quell-workeroutcry.html> (last visited July 9, 2009).
137 Monica Guizar, ICE Conducted 1-9 Audit to Help Employer Retaliate against Work-
ers, 21 Immigrants' Rights Update 6 (July 20, 2007), available at <http://www.nilc.org/
immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/eev013.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
138 Lydersen, An Unfolding Crisis in the Wake of Mississippi ICE Raid, In These
Times (cited in note 1).
139 Over-Raided, Under Siege (cited in note 9).
140 Lydersen, An Unfolding Crisis in the Wake of Mississippi ICE Raid, In These
Times (cited in note 1).
141 Issue Brief- Immigration Enforcement During Labor Disputes at 2 (Natl Immigra-
tion Law Center Apr 2007), available at <http://nilc.orgimmsemplymntlWRMaterial/
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tionary and does not prohibit immigration enforcement in cases
where there are labor disputes in progress. 142 Thus, in ICE's zeal
to target unscrupulous employers, worker complaints have in-
itiated ICE investigations and enforcement actions. Yet, the
workers' unlawful presence takes precedence over the labor
abuse they may have experienced and their employers are al-
lowed to continue to disregard fair labor standards.
Recent political will has encouraged some restraint on high
profile raids. 143 However, worksite enforcement continues to be a
priority of ICE and ICE's official policy promotes a strategy that
addresses "both employers who knowingly hire illegal workers as
well as the workers themselves." 144 Thus, in addition to the
criminal prosecution of employers who violate immigration laws,
"ICE will continue to arrest and process for removal any illegal
workers who are found in the course of these worksite
enforcement actions."' 45 An increase in the auditing of employers
suspected of hiring unauthorized labor1 46 and pressure to
implement E-Verify,147  which electronically verifies an
employee's immigration status, demonstrate the government's
continued push to execute IRCA's prohibition on the employment
of undocumented workers. As immigrants' rights advocates note,
the enforcement of IRCA's employer sanction provisions through
these more "politically palatable" methods, will have the effect of
perpetuating the vulnerability of undocumented workers to
employer abuse and will subject these workers to ICE arrest
without civil recourse.' 48
By detaining and deporting undocumented workers, ICE not
only fails to protect them from egregious employment abuses, but
Advocate/labordispute infobrief_2007-04-23.pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
142 Id.
143 Spencer S. Hsu, DHS Signals Policy Changes Ahead for Immigration Raids, Wash-
ington Post (March 29, 2009), available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/O329/AR2009032901109_pf.html> (last visited July 9, 2009).
144 ICE Fact Sheet (April 30, 2009) available at <http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/fact
sheets/worksite.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
145 Id.
146 Anna Gorman, L.A. Employers Face Immigration Audits, L.A. Times (July 2, 2009)
available at <http://www.latimes.com/news/localila-me-immigemploy2-2009jul0 2 ,0,
7434438.story?track=rss> (last visited July 9, 2009).
147 Julia Preston, Government to Require Verification of Workers, NY Times (July 8,
2009) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/us/politics/09immig.
html? r=5> (last visited July 9, 2009).
148 Bill Ong Hing and David Bacon, Rights, Not Raids, The Nation (May 18, 2009)
available at <http://www.thenation.comdoc/20090518[hing-baconrel=hp-currently> (last
visited July 9, 2009).
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also actively prevents the workers from holding their unscrupul-
ous employers directly accountable in civil court. Workers are
denied the civil relief to which they are entitled. While the bad
faith employers may be found criminally liable for immigration-
related violations such as "alien harboring" and "alien smug-
gling," they escape liability for the civil and employment viola-
tions that they committed against their workers. And society's
condemnation of these workplace-related civil rights violations
also falls short because the primary mechanism by which these
rights are enforced-the private attorney general lawsuit-must
be brought by the injured undocumented worker who, as a result
of immigration enforcement, is unable to access the civil courts.
The next Section describes human trafficking in the U.S.
and the laws designed to combat it, paying special attention to
the trafficking private right of action, and immigration relief for
trafficked persons. Granting of immigration status to trafficked
plaintiffs empowers them to fulfill the role of private attorney
general to enforce workplace-related civil rights violations. Thus,
the trafficked worker as private attorney general presents a
model for the civil rights enforcement by all undocumented
workers harmed as a result of workplace exploitation.
PART II
A. Human Trafficking in the United States
Descriptions of workplace conditions for undocumented
workers are remarkably similar to well-known human trafficking
cases in the U.S. In 2001, workers escaped from the Daewoosa
garment factory in American Samoa, leading to the investigation
of the largest human trafficking case ever prosecuted by the U.S.
Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 149 Two hundred fifty men and
women, recruited from China and Vietnam, involuntarily labored
in the Daewoosa sweatshop for minimal pay and under abusive
conditions. In 2002, a court convicted agricultural crew leaders
for trafficking Mexican farm workers to Florida, forcing them to
"work off" their transportation debts and subjecting them to con-
stant surveillance and threats of violence. 150 In 2004, a landscape
149 See generally US Department of Justice, Report on Activities to Combat Human
Trafficking, Fiscal Years 2001-2005 at 75 (Feb 24, 2006) [hereinafter Combat Human
Trafficking Report], available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crimItraffickingreport-2006.
pd > (last visited July 9, 2009).
150 Id at 76.
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maintenance contractor in Hawaii was convicted of slavery and
harboring offenses after forcing Tongan males to work in his
business twelve hours per day for menial pay under threats and
violence. 151 The reach of traffickers extends throughout indus-
tries, including domestic service, restaurants, construction, agri-
culture, garment, and commercial sex. 152
Recruitment methods often involve luring people with mis-
represented job opportunities. A trafficking recruiter can be a
family friend, an employment agency, or even someone trusted
and well known within the community. 153 People may accept jobs
that they know to be risky154 and become trafficked when ex-
ploitative working conditions replace the promised employment
terms. Traffickers achieve compliance of a trafficked person
through numerous ways including threats to harm the family of
the trafficked person, threats to turn a trafficked person over to
authorities, 15 5 confiscation of documents, psychological abuse,
including intimidation or restriction of movement, the creation of
artificial debts purportedly owed to the trafficker, and physical
abuse, such as beatings and sexual assault.15 6
Globalization and international migration play key roles in
the creation of populations vulnerable to trafficking.157 A variety
151 Id at 80.
152 Stumpf and Friedman, 6 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol at 153 (cited in note 7).
153 US Department of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000: Trafficking in Persons Report at 7, 47 (June 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Trafficking in
Persons Report], available at <http://www.state.gov/gttip/rls/tiprpt/2009/index.htm> (last
visited July 9, 2009); US Department of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protec-
tion Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report at 10, 13 (June 2008) [hereinafter 2008
Trafficking in Persons Report], available at <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls
tiprpt/2008/index.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009); US Department of State, Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report at 26 (June
2007) [hereinafter 2007 Trafficking in Persons Report], available at <http://www.state.
gov/g/tip/rlsltiprpt/2007/index.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009)
154 See Linda R. Hirshman and Jane Larson, Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex at
23-28 (Oxford 1998) (discussing game theory and rational choices that individuals make
in difficult circumstances with few options). 'To take the classic example, when a captive
agrees to slavery rather than be killed, the choice of enslavement is the making of a bar-
gain." Id at 26. In the case of coercion or fraud, not only may options be few, but misin-
formation negates the meaningfulness of any bargain struck. Id.
155 Traffickers may accurately or inaccurately portray law enforcement as unsympa-
thetic to the trafficked person's situation.
156 2009 Trafficking in Persons Report at 26, 36; Leroy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global
Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing the Success of the United Nations Protocol to
Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 227, 229-30 (2003). See also
Margaret Murphy, Modern Day Slavery: The Trafficking of Women to the United States, 9
Buff Women's L J 11, 14 (2000-2001).
157 Aiko Joshi, The Face of Human Trafficking, 13 Hastings Women's L J 31, 36-37
(2002).
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of factors may "push" trafficked persons from their countries of
origin and "pull" them into destination countries. Trafficked per-
sons are often in precarious life situations in their country of ori-
gin.158 Their situations pressure them to migrate for economic
reasons or "to escape gender discrimination, armed conflict, polit-
ical instability, and poverty."1 59 They are then particularly vul-
nerable for recruitment to labor in sweatshops and other jobs
characterized as three D-jobs-dirty, difficult, and dangerous.' 60
The demand for cheap labor in destination countries draws
migrants susceptible to trafficking. Tight border controls and
rigid immigration enforcement ironically facilitates their exploi-
tation rather than prevents it: "A lack of viable and legal migra-
tion options leads people into trafficking; fear of deportation
keeps them there."16' Thus, the relationship between human
trafficking and global labor migration is inextricable: "Traffick-
ing is a corrupted mode of migration, that transforms very specif-
ic migratory projects, such as the desire to accumulate savings or
support one's dependants by migrating to work, the dream of se-
curing a better future ... into nightmares.'
1 62
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
"trafficking in human beings has reached epidemic proportions"
in the last decade. 163 Further, no country is immune from the
effects of this highly profitable industry.164 "Illegal migrants and
158 See Kelly E. Hyland, Comment, The Impact of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 8 No 2 Hum Rts
Brief 35-6 (2001), available at <http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/08/2protocol.cfm>
(last visited July 9, 2009) (citing several causative socioeconomic factors behind the vul-
nerability to being trafficked). See also Joshi, 13 Hastings Women's L J at 36-38 (cited in
note 157) (discussing the impact of industrialization in the post-colonial era and modern
globalization on the displacement of people that leads to trafficking, particularly the
trafficking of women who are especially vulnerable due to their subordination within the
socioeconomic pressures created by privatization and liberalization of markets).
159 Joshi, 13 Hastings Women's L J at 30 (cited in note 157).
160 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, FAQ on Trafficking in Human Beings, available at
<http://www.unodc.orgtunodc/en/human-trafficking/faqs.html > (last visited July 9, 2009).
161 Dina Francesca Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immi-
gration Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of
Traffickers, 26 Hum Rts Q 221, 257 (2004).
162 Bridget Anderson and Julia O'Connell Davidson, Is Trafficking in Human Beings
Demand Driven? A Multi-Country Pilot Study, 15 Migration Research Series 8 (Intl Or-
ganization for Migration 2003), available at <http://www.compas.ox.ac.uklfileadmin
files/pdfsNon WP pdfs/Reports~andOtherPublications/Anderson04.pdf> (last visited
July 9, 2009).
163 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Office on Drugs and Crime Leaflet on Traf-
ficking at 2, available at http://www.unodc.orgdocuments/human-trafficking[HTGPA
Tleaflet07_en.pdf (last visited July 9, 2009).
164 Id.
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trafficking victims have become another commodity in a larger
realm of criminal commerce involving other commodities, such as
narcotic drugs and firearms or weapons and money launder-
ing."165
Published numbers on the global scope of human trafficking
vary widely. The U.S. State Department's 2003 Trafficking in
Persons Report ("TIP Report") estimates that approximately
eight-hundred thousand to nine-hundred thousand people are
traded worldwide.166 The 2004 report inexplicably reduced that
range to six-hundred thousand to eight-hundred thousand
people.167 The 2005 through 2008 TIP Reports maintain the six-
hundred thousand to eight-hundred thousand figure while also
acknowledging the existence of other estimates. 168 The United
Nations, for instance, approximates as many as four million
people are trafficked annually worldwide. 169 Finally, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization calculates both internal and transna-
tional modern-day slavery at 12.3 million people in forced or
bonded labor or sexual servitude at any given time.170 The dis-
parity in numbers may be due to political differences of opinion
or methodological difficulties in obtaining accurate information
about an underground industry. However, there are widespread
reports that trafficking is one of the "fastest growing illegal busi-
nesses. 171 Moreover, due to the very high revenue-to-risk ratio
and because humans are "expendable, reusable, and re-sellable
cheap commodities," the U.N. predicts human trafficking will
165 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, FAQ on Trafficking in Human Beings, available at
<http://www.unodc.orglunodc/en/human-trafficking/faqs.html > (last visited July 9, 2009)
166 US Department of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000: Trafficking in Persons Report at 7 (June 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Trafficking in
Persons Report], available at <http://www.state.gov/gttip/rls/tiprpt/2003/index.htm> (last
visited July 9, 2009).
167 US Department of State, Victims of 7rafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000: Trafficking in Persons Report (June 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Trafficking in Persons
Report], available at <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/index.htm> (last visited
July 9, 2009).
168 US Department of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000: Trafficking in Persons Report at 6 (June 2005), available at <http:/www.
state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprptl2005/index.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009). See also 2008 Traf-
ficking in Persons Report at 6.
169 UN Economic & Social Council, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the
Gender Perspective 1 5 (Feb 22, 2003), available at <http://www.unhchr.chlhuridocda/
huridoca.nsfIAllSymbols68B98DB9CB4CBEA9C1256CFBO04C53AD/$File/G0311186.
pdf> (last visited July 9, 2009).
170 US Department of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of
2000: Trafficking in Persons Report at 6 (June 2009), available at <http://www.state.gov/
g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/index.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
171 Stumpf and Friedman, 6 NYU J Legis & Pub Policy at 150 (cited in note 7).
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surpass the trafficking of both arms and narcotics to become the
world's leading illegal industry. 172
Like the global figures, estimates of the scope of trafficking
in the United States also vary widely. The 2003 TIP Report ap-
proximated that eighteen thousand to twenty thousand traf-
ficked persons enter the United States annually; 173 the 2004 TIP
Report reduced that estimate to 14,500 to 17,500.174 Previous
estimates placed the number of persons trafficked to the United
States on an annual basis closer to fifty thousand. 175 The Inter-
national Labor Organization estimates that human trafficking
comprises over 75 percent of all forced labor cases in the United
States.176
The emergence of human trafficking as a multifaceted epi-
demic has required a new legal regime to combat it. Previous
understandings of chattel slavery, debt bondage, and involuntary
servitude-which required a relationship of ownership, indeb-
tedness, or direct or threatened physical or legal force-proved
inadequate to capture the conceptual complexity of human traf-
ficking. Human trafficking refers to a broader global phenome-
non involving the migration of workers for the purpose of exploi-
tation. Exploitation may include previously recognized forms of
unfree labor, however, more characteristic of human trafficking
are new forms of exploitation that utilize psychological means to
coerce labor. Examples of psychological coercion include a vic-
tim's cultural isolation, financial or emotional dependency on the
trafficker, and threats to harm a victim's family members. 177
Furthermore, human trafficking is not simply migrant
smuggling, which involves only the facilitation of movement
across borders. Human trafficking requires a continued relation-
ship of exploitation that profits the trafficker. 178 The boundary
between smuggling and trafficking is crossed when a voluntary
172 Jennifer L. Enck, The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Orga-
nized Crime: Is It All That It Is Cracked Up To Be?, 30 Syracuse J Intl L & Comm 369,
374 (2003), quoting Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Sex Sells But Drugs Don't Talk: Trafficking of
Women Sex Workers, 23 T Jefferson L Rev 194, 212-13 (2001).
173 2003 Trafficking in Persons Report at 7 (cited in note 168).
174 2004 Trafficking in Persons Report at 23 (cited in note 167).
175 Annuska Derks, Combating Trafficking in South-East Asia: A Review of Policy and
Programme Responses at 5 (IOM Intl Organization for Migration 2000), available at
<http://www.unesco.orgtmost/migration/ctsea.pdf>(last visited July 9, 2009).
176 Report of the Director General: A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour at 14 (Intl
Labour organization 2005), available at <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATION
WEB.DOWNLOADBLOB?VarDocumentID=5059> (last visited July 9, 2009).
177 See Potts, 35 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 233 (cited in note 156).
178 Murphy, 9 Buff Women's L J at 11-12 (cited in note 156).
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migrant utilizes the services of a smuggler, but is then forced to
work off newly accrued debt under subsequent threats of harm,
such as exposure to law enforcement or deportation. 179 The traf-
ficker's coercive or deceptive actions render the initial voluntari-
ness of the trafficked person meaningless.180
B. U.S. Anti-Trafficking Laws
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 ("TVPA") was
enacted to comprehensively combat human trafficking in the
United States by strengthening criminal laws against the traf-
fickers, establishing immigration relief for certain trafficking
victims in the United States, and requiring the U.S. Department
of State to study the global problem of trafficking and issue its
findings in an annual report on the status of other states regard-
ing their anti-trafficking efforts.181
The TVPA defines "severe forms of trafficking" as either:
(A) sex trafficking 8 2 in which a commercial sex act18 3 is
induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person
induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of
age; or
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision,
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the
use of force, fraud, coercion for the purpose of subjection
to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or sla-
very. 184
The definition acknowledges that the various purposes of
trafficking in persons include exploitation in both the commercial
179 See Anderson and O'Connell Davidson, 15 Migration Research Series at 50 (cited
in note 162).
180 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, FAQ on Trafficking in Human Beings (cited in note
160).
181 Pub L No 106-386, Division A, 114 Stat 1466, codified at 22 USC § 7101 et seq
(describing the purpose of the act as "[t]o combat trafficking in persons, especially into
the sex trade, slavery, and involuntary servitude, [and] to reauthorize certain Federal
programs to prevent violence against women"). See also Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a
Human Rights Violation: The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualiz-
ing and Combating Trafficking, 24 Mich J Intl L 1143, 1159-60 (2003).
182 22 USC § 7102(9) (2000) (defining sex trafficking as "the recruitment, harboring,
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex
act").
183 22 USC § 7102(3) (defining a commercial sex act as "any sex act on account of
which anything of value is given to or received by any person").
184 22 USC § 7102(8).
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sex industry and other industries, such as agriculture, domestic
service, garment manufacturing, construction, and restau-
rants.185
The TVPA was reauthorized and amended in 2003, 2005,
and 2008. In addition to appropriating funding for continued
anti-trafficking efforts, the 2003 amendments included a private
right of action.18 6 The 2005 amendments included provisions to
increase research and prevention efforts.187 The 2008 reauthori-
zation188 greatly expanded the TVPA to reach a wider range of
prohibited conduct and to confer additional civil rights to traf-
ficked persons. Most significantly, the 2008 amendments speci-
fically grant immigration status to trafficked persons who sue
their traffickers in civil court.189
Although the 2008 TVPA included numerous amendments,
this Article focuses on the 2008 changes that relate to the traf-
ficking private right of action and to the immigration relief asso-
ciated with this civil claim. A trafficking civil action does not de-
pend on the existence of a parallel criminal prosecution or crimi-
nal convictions against the defendant traffickers. However, the
legal substance of the trafficking civil remedy is derived from
violations of trafficking crimes. Therefore, an accurate under-
standing of the trafficking private right of action depends on fa-
miliarity with the trafficking criminal statutes.
Trafficking crimes are primarily prosecuted under the crim-
inal statutes of "forced labor,"190 "trafficking into servitude," 191
and "sex trafficking"192 enacted pursuant to the § 2 enforcement
power of the Thirteenth Amendment. The addition of these crim-
inal statutes to Thirteenth Amendment doctrine expands the
law's understanding of involuntary servitude to include labor
forced by non-physical, psychological coercion.1 93
185 Hyland, 8 No 2 Hum Rts Brief at 33 (cited in note 158).
186 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, 117 Stat at 2875
(amending the TVPA and appropriating funds for 2004 and 2005).
187 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub L No 109-164, 119
Stat 3558, codified at scattered sections of titles 18, 22, 42 (2006).
188 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
HR 7311, 110th Cong, 2d Sess (Dec 9, 2008).
189 HR 7311 at §205.
190 18 USC § 1589 (2000 & Supp 2008).
191 18 USC § 1590 (2000 & Supp 2008).
192 18 USC § 1591 (2000 & Supp 2008).
193 See generally Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the Context of Modern-Day
Involuntary Labor: Revisiting U.S. v. Kozminski and Understanding Human Trafficking,
38 U Toledo L Rev 941 (2007) (Part II at 945-55 discusses the law under Kozminski while
Part III at 955-68 discusses the law in the aftermath of the TVPA.).
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This important addition to the Thirteenth Amendment's en-
forcement provisions is best exemplified by the new crime of
"forced labor." The crime of "forced labor" was enacted to directly
address previous obstacles to the enforcement of involuntary ser-
vitude violations under a restrictive definition set forth by the
Supreme Court in United States v Kozminski. 194 The Kozminski
Court narrowly interpreted the definition of involuntary servi-
tude as servitude brought about through the use or threatened
use of physical or legal coercion, excluding the use of psychologi-
cal coercion as sufficient means to compel labor.
195
As explained in the TVPA's legislative conference report, the
new crime of "forced labor" "provide[s] federal prosecutors with
the tools to combat severe forms of worker exploitation that do
not rise to the level of involuntary servitude as defined in Koz-
minski."1 96 The addition of this crime fulfills a main objective of
the TVPA to reach cases of involuntary servitude "in which per-
sons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coer-
cion. '197 By capturing non-physical coercion, the TVPA advances
the mandate of the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit slavery
and involuntary servitude in all its forms.
Thus, the crime of "forced labor" prohibits labor compelled by
physical coercion defined as "force, threats of force, physical re-
straint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another
person;" legal coercion defined as "abuse or threatened abuse of
law or legal process;" and non-physical coercion defined as "se-
rious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another
person ... or any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the
person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor
or services, that person or another person would suffer serious
harm or physical restraint."198 The 2008 amendments to the
TVPA provide further definition to the concept of non-physical
coercion and increased clarity to the types of conduct prohibited
by the forced labor statute. First, the range of non-physical
harms that are legally sufficient to make a showing of forced la-
194 487 US 931 (1988).
195 Id at 943 ("[Olur precedents clearly define a Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of
involuntary servitude enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.
The guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude has never been interpreted specifi-
cally to prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological coercion.").
196 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, HR Rep No 106-939,
106th Cong, 2d Sess 101 (2000).
197 22 USC § 7101(b)(13).
198 18 USC § 1589(a) (2000 & Supp 2008).
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bor include "psychological, financial, or reputational harm."' 99 To
determine the seriousness of these harms, the statute instructs
consideration of "all the surrounding circumstances" and an ap-
plication of a "reasonable person" standard with the "same back-
ground" and "in the same circumstances." 200 Furthermore, with
respect to legal coercion, the 2008 TVPA amendments clarify
that compelling labor through threats of any legal proceeding
whether "administrative, civil, or criminal"20 1 also constitutes a
violation of forced labor. Thus, threats of deportation-an admin-
istrative proceeding-also qualify as a prohibited means of legal
coercion. The impact of the 2008 amendments are not yet known,
but could cover a broad array of worker abuses, including those
typically found in the cases of undocumented worker exploitation
described in Part 1.202
The trafficking private right of action ("TVPRA") allows an
individual who is a victim of a trafficking to bring a civil action
in a district court to recover damages and reasonable attorneys'
fees. 20 3 A civil action filed under § 1595 shall be stayed during the
criminal action arising out of the same occurrence. 20 4 A claim
under § 1595 may be made even in the absence of a criminal in-
vestigation or prosecution. 20 5
Prior to the 2008 amendments, in order to bring a viable
claim under § 1595, the plaintiff must have been a victim of one
of three specified trafficking crimes: forced labor, trafficking into
servitude, or sex trafficking. After the 2008 amendments, any
violation of a trafficking-related crime enumerated within Chap-
ter 77 of Title 18 is grounds for civil relief.20 6
An individual who is a victim of a violation ... may bring
a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever kno-
wingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
199 18 USC § 1589(c)(2) (2000).
200 Id.
201 18 USC § 1589(c)(1).
202 The Author explores the scope of coercion in light of the 2008 TVPA in her parallel
project, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers.
203 18 USC § 1595(a) ("An individual who is a victim of a violation may bring a civil
action against the perpetrator ... may recover... reasonable attorneys fees.").
204 18 USC § 1595(b)(1) ("Any civil action filed under this section shall be stayed dur-
ing the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the
claimant is the victim.").
205 18 USC § 1595 (not conditioning a § 1595 claim on a criminal investigation or pros-
ecution).
206 18 USC § 1590.
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value from participation in a venture which that person
knew or should have known has engaged in an act in vi-
olation of this chapter ... ) in an appropriate district court
of the United States and may recover damages and rea-
sonable attorneys fees. 207
Thus, a private right of action now exists for the above de-
scribed forced labor statute, which encompasses all forms of non-
physically coerced labor as well as every provision of in Chapter
77 Title 18 of the U.S. Code including peonage under § 1581,
document theft under § 1592,208 and even fraud in foreign labor
contracting. 20 9 The 2008 amendments also expand the pool of
potential defendants to include not just the direct perpetrators of
the trafficking crime, but also those who "knowingly" benefited,
financially or otherwise, from the trafficking activity.210 The
range of defendants is further widened through the 2008 TVPA's
extra-territorial provisions which extend liability for trafficking
violations to jurisdictions outside the U.S. where the alleged per-
petrator is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, or present
in the U.S. 21 1 These changes increase the ammunition of traf-
ficked plaintiffs and provide broad potential for the trafficked
plaintiff to enforce a wider range of Thirteenth Amendment re-
lated harms.
Most significant among the 2008 amendments is the availa-
bility of "continued presence." Continued presence is a temporary
form of immigration relief for trafficking victims who pursue civil
207 18 USC § 1595(a) (2003 & Supp 2008).
208 18 USC § 1592 (2000 & Supp 2008) ("Whoever knowingly destroys, conceals, re-
moves, confiscates, or possesses any actual or purported passport or other immigration
document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of
another person-(1) in the course of a violation of section 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590,
1591, or 1594(a); (2) with intent to violate section 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591;
or (3) to prevent or restrict or to attempt to prevent or restrict, without lawful authority,
the person's liberty to move or travel, in order to maintain the labor or services of that
person, when the person is or has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons,
as defined in section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both."); 18 USC § 1594 (2000
& Supp 2008) ("[W]hoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of
value from participation in a venture which has engaged in any act in violation of section
1581(a), 1592, or 1595(a), knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture
has engaged in such violation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned in the same
manner as a completed violation of such section.").
209 18 USC § 1351 (imposing criminal liability on those who knowingly and with in-
tent to defraud, recruit workers from outside the U.S. for employment within the U.S. by
means of materially false or fraudulent representations).
210 18 USC § 1589(b); 18 USC § 1593(a) (2000 & Supp 2008).
211 HR 7311 § 1596.
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litigation against their traffickers. 212 The addition of "continued
presence" for civil litigants indicates that Congress intended to
increase trafficked persons' empowerment as private attorneys
general. Previously, continued presence could only be granted
through a request by a federal law enforcement official to DHS if
the victim's presence in the U.S. was necessary for criminal in-
vestigation and prosecution purposes.213 DHS may now grant
continued presence to allow trafficked persons who have filed a
civil action under § 1595 to remain in the United States until the
conclusion of their civil case. Continued presence does not allow
for adjustment to legal permanent residence, but it does provide
work authorization and access to refugee benefits, thereby grant-
ing a valuable safety net for trafficked persons engaged in civil
suits against their traffickers.
Continued presence supplements the two main forms of im-
migration relief provided by the TVPA: the T visa 214 and the U
visa.215 The T visa allows certain victims of human trafficking to
live and work in U.S. for four years. T visa recipients can petition
to have their spouses and children join them in the U.S. T visa
recipients also receive refugee benefits, including cash assistance
for eight months and may obtain an adjustment to legal perma-
nent residency. Eligibility for the T visa requires that the appli-
cant is or has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in per-
sons; is present in U.S., American Samoa, or Northern Marianas
on account of trafficking; has complied with reasonable requests
for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of acts of traf-
ficking;216 and would suffer extreme hardship upon removal. The
2005 TVPA reauthorization provided for a hardship exception to
the requirement that the T visa applicant demonstrate com-
pliance with requests for assistance in the criminal investigation
and prosecution of the trafficking. 217
212 HR 7311 at §205.
213 22 USC § 7105(c) (2008).
214 INA § 101(a)(15)(T) (2000).
215 INA § 101(a)(15)(U) (2000).
216 INA§ 101(a)(15)(T) (2000) (children under eighteen who are sex trafficking victims
do not need to meet the criterion of complying with assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of the trafficking crime).
217 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
HR 3402 §801(b), 109th Cong, 1st Sess (July 22, 2005); 8 USC § I101(a)(15)(T)(iii) (2006)
("[1]f the Secretary of Homeland Security, in his or her discretion and with the consulta-
tion of the Attorney General, determines that a trafficking victim, due to psychological or
physical trauma, is unable to cooperate with a request for assistance described in clause
(i)(III)(aa), the request is unreasonable.). To date, the Author is unaware of any cases
that have successfully used this provision.
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The U visa may also provide trafficking victims with immi-
gration relief. It provides work authorization, allows recipients to
petition to have their spouses and children join them in the U.S.
and permits adjustment to legal permanent residency. Unlike
the T visa, it does not provide refugee benefits. In order to re-
ceive a U visa, the applicant must show that he or she is a victim
of a crime specifically enumerated in the U visa statute. Traffick-
ing is a qualifying crime, as well as domestic violence, rape, sex-
ual assault and torture.218 The U visa applicant must also show
that he or she suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a
result of the crime and has been, is being, or is likely to be help-
ful to law enforcement in the investigation or prosecution of the
crime. Since there were no U visa implementing regulations until
last year, there is currently no data on the number of U visas
that have been or will be awarded. However, prima facie eligible
U visa applicants have received "interim relief," a temporary
form of relief that provides work authorization. To receive inter-
im relief, an applicant must be "certified" as eligible by "the head
of the certifying agency, or any person(s) in a supervisory role
who has been specifically designated to issue U nonimmigrant
status certifications ... or a Judge."219 With the issuance of the U
visa regulations, interim relief recipients are now instructed to
apply for the U visa according to the regulations.
Regulations for T visas have been implemented since 2001.
The most recent data shows that through fiscal year 2008, 1,245
T visas had been approved at an estimated 50 percent approval
rate.220 Yet, the TVPA allows for five thousand T visas per year
for principal applicants, excluding family derivatives. Therefore,
from 2001 to 2008, there were an allowable forty-five thousand T
visas available. Advocates and scholars have scrutinized the low
number of T visas awarded. Many have critiqued the govern-
ment's general anti-trafficking strategy which places primary
218 Other qualifying crimes include: rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic vi-
olence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; female
genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; kid-
napping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment; blackmail; extor-
tion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness tampering; obstruction of justice;
perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned
crimes.
219 8 CFR § 214.14(a)(3).
220 This number was calculated from tallying the reported number of T visa approvals
from the Attorney General's Annual Report to Congress on U.S. Government Activities to
Combat Trafficking in Persons 2001-2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/whatwedo/whatwedo-ctip.html> (last visited July 9, 2009).
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emphasis on the criminal prosecution of traffickers as the reason
for the low numbers.221 Some commentators have argued that the
link between T visa eligibility and cooperation with law enforce-
ment in the investigation and prosecution of the trafficking is too
onerous, subjecting trafficking victims to further trauma if they
must ultimately participate in criminal proceedings against their
traffickers. 222 Others contend that the government's focus on
criminal enforcement makes protection measures for trafficked
individuals contingent upon federal law enforcement choosing to
investigate and prosecute trafficking violations. 23 The inherent
selectivity in the prosecutorial process and its utilization of traf-
ficking victims as witnesses for the criminal process leave many
trafficked persons excluded from protection benefits and ulti-
mately from full access to justice. Another major criticism of U.S.
anti-trafficking policy is its conflation of prostitution with traf-
ficking. Human rights activists report that anti-trafficking poli-
cies under the Bush Administration focused funding and re-
sources on enforcement of only sex trafficking crimes, thereby
withholding protection and alienating trafficked persons in other
labor sectors.224
This Author has explored these arguments in other works.225
Notwithstanding these critiques, this Article posits that the
availability of various forms of trafficking-related immigration
relief ultimately supports the role of trafficking victims as pri-
vate attorneys general. As explored in the next Section, traf-
ficked plaintiffs have sued their perpetrators in civil court and
221 Grace Chang and Kathleen Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human
Trafficking: New Directions and Perspectives from the Field(s), 3 Stan J CR CL 317
(2007); Jennifer Chacon, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts
to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 Fordham L Rev 2977 (2006); Haynes, 26 Hum Rts Q at
257 (cited in note 161).
222 Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia Walter, and Jose Hidalgo, Human Trafficking in the
United States: Expanding Victim Protection Beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16 Stan L and
Pol Rev 379, 381 (2005).
223 Consider Chang and Kim, 3 Stan J CR CL 317 (cited in note 221); Chacon, 74
Fordham L Rev 2977 (cited in note 221); Haynes, 26 Hum Rts Q at 257 (cited in note 161).
224 Id. See also Debbie Nathan, Oversexed, Nation 27 (Aug 29, 2005); Bernice Yeung,
Enslaved in Palo Alto, SF Weekly (Feb 18, 2004), available at <http://www.sfweekly.com
2004-02-18/news/enslaved-in-palo-alto> (last visited July 9, 2009). Out of 196 cases pros-
ecuted since the passage of the TVPA, over two-thirds have involved sex trafficking.
225 Chang and Kim, 3 Stan J CR CL 317 (cited in note 221); Kathleen Kim, Charles
Song, and Sri Panchalam, Conversations with Two Anti-Trafficking Advocates, Los An-
geles Public Interest Law Journal (2009), available at <www.lapilj.org>; Kim, 38 U Tole-
do L Rev 941 (cited in note 193); Kathleen Kim and Kusia Hreschyshyn, Human Traffick-
ing Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16
Hastings Women's L J 1 (2004).
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have also received TVPA-related immigration relief, allowing
them to assert their civil rights unimpeded by immigration re-
strictions. The pursuit of civil relief diverts attention away from
the criminal process, allows trafficked plaintiffs to direct their
own legal case, and vindicates civil rights violations left unvindi-
cated by law enforcement. The next Section considers the bene-
fits of these civil actions both for the individual seeking relief
and for the national interest in upholding civil rights impera-
tives. The next Section also shows that similar benefits may be
gained in the undocumented worker context if the laws enabling
the trafficked worker as private attorney general were extended
to all undocumented workers who suffer civil rights violations in
the workplace.
PART III: THE TRAFFICKED WORKER AND UNDOCUMENTED
WORKER AS PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
On February 27, 2008, ICE raided Audubon Pointe, a con-
struction worksite in New Orleans that employed undocumented
workers to repair apartments that were damaged by Hurricane
Katrina. 226 ICE took into custody seven workers, who, through
counsel, had issued a demand letter to their employer citing vio-
lations of the FLSA for consistent non-payment and underpay-
ment of wages for labor they had performed.227 The workers be-
lieved that ICE initiated the raid after receiving a tip from their
employer who had previously threatened the workers with law
enforcement arrest for complaining about their working condi-
tions. On March 17, 2008, while detained at the Orleans Parish
Prison without bond and facing deportation, the workers gave
their attorneys consent to file a civil complaint on their behalf
and those "similarly situated," seeking relief for violations of the
FLSA and the TVPA.228 The complaint further alleged that the
employer housed the workers in unfurnished substandard
apartment units at the construction site in order to "maintain
access to and control over the workforce. 229 The employers also
threatened to evict the plaintiffs and on different occasions had
locked the workers out of their apartments as a scheme to force
the workers to comply with the working conditions. 230
226 Complaint, Garcia v Audubon, No 08-01291, at 16 (E D La Mar 17, 2008).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 13
230 Id at 14-15.
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With deportation imminent, the continuation of the civil case
was logistically impracticable. On April 18, 2008, based on the
allegations in the civil complaint, a federal judge "certified" the
workers as victims of human trafficking and therefore eligible for
TVPA related immigration relief.23' The judge ordered the term-
ination of the removal proceedings, and ICE released the work-
ers from immigration detention. With the security of immigra-
tion status, the workers pushed forward with their civil action.
As this example illustrates, trafficked workers who act as
private attorneys general to enforce civil rights violations against
their unscrupulous employers tell a different story than the ex-
ploited, yet deportable, undocumented workers described in Part
I. The conferral of immigration status to trafficked workers sup-
ports their role as private attorneys general while the unlawful
status of undocumented workers often takes precedence over
their civil claims against abusive employers.
This Part discusses the law's support of the trafficked work-
er as private attorney general and argues that similar support
should be extended to undocumented immigrants injured by ex-
ploitive employers. Drawing from Professor William B. Ruben-
stein's delineation of a private attorney general continuum,
which evaluates the public and private functions of private at-
torneys general, this Part explains that the strong public policy
role exercised by trafficked plaintiffs justifies the laws that ena-
ble them. This Part contends that similar public policy reasons
justify the law's endorsement of other exploited undocumented
workers to act as private attorneys general.
A. The Private-Public Functions of the Private
Attorney General
As discussed in Part I, the private attorney general seeks to
obtain not only individual relief, but also accomplishes important
public policy goals, thereby assuming both private and public
roles. According to Professor Rubenstein, this mix of "public and
private functions" occurs in many ways that can be mapped onto
a "lawyering spectrum that runs from private lawyering on one
side to public lawyering on the other."232 The private attorney
general falls in the middle; within the middle, there are three
types of private attorneys general: substitute, supplemental, and
231 Order, Garcia v Audubon, No 08-01291 (E D La Apr 14, 2008).
232 Rubenstein, 57 Vand L Rev at 2171 (cited in note 28).
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simulated.233 Each type has varying levels of public and private
functions. The substitute attorney general serves a strong public
role. These are private attorneys hired by the government to "lit-
erally perform the exact functions of the attorney general's office
though they themselves are not attorneys general."234 The simu-
lated attorney general serves a strong private function; by
representing a private interest, he may obtain "a fund that will
benefit an entire group of individuals, even if the case was not
actually prosecuted on behalf of the whole group or as a repre-
sentative action."235 The fund may have the consequence of bene-
fiting a larger group, but this benefit was not contemplated as a
goal of the litigation.236
The supplemental private attorneys general are those whose
work "contributes to the public interest by supplementing the
government's enforcement of laws and public policies."237 Within
this category, the mix of public versus private functions also dif-
fers in quantity:
Some supplemental attorneys general perform significant
public functions with only scant private interests at stake
(such as environmental citizen-suit plaintiffs) while oth-
ers perform incidental public functions with significant
private interests at stake (such as mass tort class action
plaintiffs).238
Between the strong public and the strong private supple-
mental private attorneys general lies the traditional account of
233 Id at 2142 ('The private attorney general concept is deployed in the legal literature
in at least three distinct ways, each of which presents a different mix of the public and
private features of lawyering: (1) some private attorneys general substitute for the public
attorney general; (2) some private attorneys general supplement the public attorney
general; and (3) some private attorneys general simulate an attorney general, acting as
the advocate for a group, but solely for a group of private persons."). It should be noted
that Professor Rubenstein's framework includes all types of private attorneys general,
including those who pursue litigation on behalf of an organization or a cause and not an
individual plaintiff. I apply his framework to individual plaintiffs.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Rubenstein, 57 Vand L Rev at 2155 (cited in note 28) ("In this sense of the term,
the private attorney general is truly a private attorney general-that is, an attorney
general for a private group of plaintiffs, not for the public interest generally. I refer to
this private attorney general as a simulated attorney general since she is performing a
function-recouping a fund for private parties-not typically associated with a public
attorney general. She is not substituting for the attorney general, nor is she generally
rewarded because her actions contribute to a public good.")
237 Id at 2146.
238 Id.
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the private attorney general-as described by the Supreme
Court: "[U]nlike most private tort litigants, the civil rights plain-
tiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights
that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms .... Regardless of
the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful civil rights
plaintiff often secures important social benefits." 239
The traditional account regards the private attorney general
as essential to "supplement" government enforcement of wrong-
doing because "private attorneys general might be better at ei-
ther discerning or pursuing private wrongdoing, or they may
simply supplement public enforcement by increasing the intensi-
ty of the penalty wrongdoers must pay."240 The supplemental
private attorney general is better equipped to rectify certain vio-
lations because they are free from the constraints of government
attorneys whose actions may be limited by scarce resources and
political pressures. 241
Professor Rubenstein argues that determining the relative
mix of a private attorney general's private and public functions is
important to inform the ways in which the law should bolster or
restrict a private attorney general action: "How much a particu-
lar type of private attorney general is thought to be an agent for
public ends, in addition to private ones, "critically affects the
rules by which we should enable (and constrain) her."242
Commentators and courts have discerned the various pri-
vate and public goods generated by private litigation. Individual
benefits largely come in the form of monetary damages compen-
sating the plaintiff for his or her actual losses and awarding pu-
nitive damages for a defendant's willful or malicious conduct.
There may be additional individual gains such as a plaintiff's
empowerment from directly holding perpetrators accountable
and the ability to exercise control over the legal case. 243
239 City of Riverside v Rivera, 477 US at 574.
240 Rubenstein, 57 Vand L Rev at 2150 (cited in note 28).
241 Id ('The private attorney general doctrine rests upon the recognition that privately
initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies
embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions and that, without some mechanism
authorizing the award of attorneys fees, private actions to enforce such important public
policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible."). See also Cal Civ Pro Code
§ 1021.5 (West 2009).
242 Rubenstein, 57 Vand L Rev at 2171 (cited in note 28).
243 Kim and Hreschyshyn, 16 Hastings Women's L J 1 (cited in note 225) (discussing
the benefits and complexities of utilizing civil litigation as a tool to complement prosecu-
torial actions against human traffickers pursuant to TVPRA).
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Public benefits of private attorney general lawsuits include
the promotion of substantive law norms, deterrence of wrong-
doing, and furtherance of accountability by avoiding the politics
of selective government enforcement. 244 The private attorney
general lawsuit-at least in the context of the class action-has
also been described as embodying a public good in and of itself,
producing "positive externalities" beyond deterrence. 245 One "pos-
itive externality," is precedent, which is "valuable not only as a
source of certainty, but also as a reasoned elaboration and visible
expression of public values." 246 Even in the absence of precedent-
setting court decisions, the litigation alone may promote legisla-
tive and social change. 247 Professor Owen M. Fiss, for example,
contends that contemporary litigation serves a social function to
identify and give meaning to the values that "stand as the core of
a public morality."248
B. The Private-Public Functions of the Trafficked Private
Attorney General
Application of Professor Rubenstein's framework to the traf-
ficking context would place the trafficked worker in the category
of the traditional supplemental private attorney general. The
trafficking private right of action is derived from the criminal
statutes enforcing trafficking crimes, thereby supplementing the
"government's enforcement of laws and public policies. '249 The
award of attorneys' fees signifies congressional recognition that
244 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Cafa's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 Car-
dozo L Rev 2517 (2007-2008) (arguing that positive externalities created by class litiga-
tions, including private attorney involvements promoting public good, are negated by the
Class Action Fairness Act allowing federalization of class action suits).
245 Id at 2554, citing William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Ex-
ternalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L Rev 709, 711 (2005-
2006).
246 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 Georgetown L J
2619, 2626 (1994-1995) (discussing the contrasting roles of adjudication and settlement
in the public interest context and avenues by which to obtain a realistic balance between
the two).
247 Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative Strat-
egy Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DePaul L Rev 493, 495
(2001-2002) (explaining a research approach to the examination of new social policy torts
involving public and private attorneys general in forming social policy through litigation
rather than legislation).
248 Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 Law &
Hum Behav 121, 124 (1982) (discussing the problems with the shift in the form of adjudi-
cation from an embodiment of public values to an instrument of political organization
through privatization of ends).
249 Rubenstein, 57 Vand L Rev at 2146 (cited in note 28).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
"privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectua-
tion of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitution-
al or statutory provisions. '" 250 Yet, in addition to promoting the
public policy of enforcing violations of human trafficking, the
trafficked worker also seeks individual relief in the form of com-
pensatory and punitive damages and therefore exercises both
public and private functions.
The relative quantities of public and private functions can be
ascertained by analyzing trafficking civil cases to date. Since the
private right of action was amended to the TVPA in 2003, ap-
proximately thirty cases have been filed. 251 Each case has sup-
plemented the current anti-trafficking criminal enforcement
framework. Many have proceeded in the absence of a criminal
prosecution; where there has been a parallel criminal prosecu-
tion, the civil litigation has increased the penalties for which
traffickers may be liable in the form of monetary damages.
Trafficking civil cases have provided both private and public
benefits. As to individual relief, trafficked plaintiffs have re-
ceived a wide range of monetary damages through settlement,
court judgment, or jury verdict. For example, in one case involv-
ing a trafficked domestic worker from Tanzania, the court or-
dered $1,059,348.79 in damages and attorneys' fees against the
defendant traffickers for approximately four years of work with-
out compensation. 252 In another case, a jury awarded approx-
imately $70,000 in damages to a trafficked domestic worker from
the Philippines. 25 3 Another court ordered a default judgment in
favor of twelve agricultural laborers amounting to almost
$9,000,000 against the defendant tree farm operators. 25 4 As an
alternative to criminal enforcement-which has been critiqued
as inadequate in vindicating the interests of trafficking victims-
civil litigation has been characterized as a source of empower-
ment for victims who exercise discretion over the direction of
their case and can utilize the civil case to express their own
narratives.255
250 Cal Civ Pro Code 1021.5 (West 2009).
251 See Appendix.
252 Mazengo v Mzengi, 542 F Supp 2d 96 (D DC 2008).
253 Cruz v Toliver, 2007 WL 1031621 (W D Ky Mar 30, 2007). See also Blair Jackson,
Enslaved Maid Wins $800,000, Daily Journal (Aug 31, 2004) (awarding a substantial
judgment to a trafficked domestic worker).
254 Aguilar v Imperial Nurseries, No. 3-07-cv-193 (D Conn May 28, 2008).
255 Kim and Hreshchyshyn, 16 Hastings Women's L J 1 (cited in note 225).
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Trafficking lawsuits have also generated public benefits of
the sort described above. Out of thirty-one cases, twenty-three
have proceeded in the absence of a parallel criminal action.256
This increases accountability for wrongdoing and vindicates
harms left unvindicated by government enforcement agencies.
Trafficking lawsuits also increase overall deterrence by creating
financial disincentives for traffickers, 257 who are subject to both
compensatory and punitive damages if found liable for traffick-
ing violations.
Trafficking litigation has also produced important precedent.
In Garcia v Audubon, the case described above, a federal judge
certified the plaintiffs for U visas and affirmed their eligibility as
victims of human trafficking for TVPA-related immigration re-
lief.258 The court recognized that "legal coercion was used against
the Plaintiffs to continue working without pay" and that the de-
fendants engaged in a "pattern of conduct ... to force the plain-
tiff-employees to work by taking advantage of the plaintiff-
employees undocumented immigration status."259 The court
noted that a parallel criminal investigation was not necessary to
establish the plaintiffs' eligibility for U visas because "the regu-
lations contemplate the future helpfulness of the applicant(s)"
and that it was therefore sufficient to show that the plaintiffs
"may be helpful at some point in the future."260 Finally, the court
explained that the U visa criteria of substantial physical or men-
tal abuse did not require a showing of battery or extreme cruelty.
The court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient phys-
ical or mental suffering based on "the living conditions they were
forced to endure," which included needing "to find food 'in the
trash,"' making them feel ashamed and distressed from malnour-
ishment.261 This published opinion provides a legal foundation
for all trafficked plaintiffs in removal proceedings to seek U visa
certification through civil courts. Moreover, the opinion rein-
forces the scope of trafficking laws to protect workers subjected
to legal coercion in the form of threats of deportation and affirms
that protection is neither contingent on an ongoing criminal in-
vestigation nor evidence of physical abuse.
256 See Appendix describing civil cases to date.
257 Id.
258 Order, Garcia v Audubon, No 08-01291, 2008 WL 1774584 (E D L Apr 14, 2008)
259 Id at *5.
260 Id at*6.
261 Id at *7.
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In another trafficking civil case, Mazengo v Mzengi,262 a fed-
eral court rejected a defendant's motion to vacate a default
judgment against him. The Minister-Counselor at the Embassy
of Tanzania to the United States, trafficked a domestic worker
from Tanzania and forced her to work as a domestic worker for
four years. The defendant argued that his position as a foreign
diplomat provided him with immunity from civil, criminal, or
administrative liability within the United States. 263 The court
held that without proof from the State Department establishing
his status as a diplomat, the defendant remained liable for the
civil damages assessed in this case. 264 The court's reluctance to
recognize diplomatic immunity provides workers trafficked by
diplomats with the possibility for relief and also allows civil
courts to condemn this conduct publically.
Additionally, trafficking civil litigation has promoted impor-
tant substantive law norms. Trafficking complaints list a number
of causes of action, including the TVPA private right of action as
well as employment violations under the FLSA and civil rights
statutes. Utilizing the TVPA private right of action advances the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude. The inclusion of FLSA-related relief in all trafficking law-
suits to date highlights the important relationship between the
Thirteenth Amendment's guarantee of free labor and the FLSA's
protection of fair labor standards. Trafficking lawsuits also fur-
ther the anti-discrimination mandates of certain civil rights sta-
tutes including Title VII,265 § 1981,266 and § 1985.267 Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from discriminat-
ing against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, na-
262 542 F Supp 2d 96 (D DC 2008).
263 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). See also, Hid-
den in the Home at 34-35 (cited in note 74).
264 542 F Supp 2d at 4.
265 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e (2000).
266 42 USC § 1981(a) (2000) ("All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.").
267 42 USC § 1985(3) (2000). ("If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire
... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of per-
sons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.").
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tional origin, or sex. 268 Section 1981 is an additional discrimina-
tion cause of action that prohibits race discrimination in the
making of contracts and terms of employment. 26 9 Section 1985
arises out of the Conspiracy Act of 1861,270 amended in 1871,271
for the purpose of enforcing Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tions. 272
Trafficking lawsuits have successfully pursued these claims.
Chellen v John Pickle Co, Inc,273 involved fifty-two workers traf-
ficked from India to labor in an Oklahoma pressure valves manu-
facturer. Compared to the non-Indian employees at the factory,
the Indian workers received egregiously substandard working
and living conditions. The Indian workers experienced physical
separation from the non-Indian workers and harassment from
their supervisors based on their ethnicity and national origin.
The workers sued their employer for gross labor violations and
Title VII discrimination. Prompted by the workers' lawsuit, the
EEOC intervened and the cases were consolidated adding a
§ 1981 claim.274 A federal court upheld the charges and assessed
compensatory and punitive damages at $1.24 million. In doing
so, the court extended § 1981 to reach claims of discrimination
based on not only race, but also ancestry and ethnicity:
268 42 USC § 2000e-2(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employ-
er-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to hiscompensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race,color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
269 42 USC § 1981(a) (2000).
270 Conspiracies Act of 1861, Ch 33, 12 Stat 284 (describing the purpose of the act as
"[t]o define and punish certain Conspiracies"), codified as amended at 42 USC § 1985(3)
(2006).
271 Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ch 22, 17 Stat 13,
codified as amended at 42 USC § 1985(3) (2006).
272 Id.
273 434 F Supp 2d 1069 (N D Okla 2006).
274 Id. Chellen is not the only example of a trafficking civil case that initiated govern-
ment enforcement action. See also Ruiz v Jackson, Cal No. SC076090, (Cal Super Ct Aug.
26, 2004) (trafficking civil case filed in state court). The trafficked plaintiff won a jury
verdict of $1.65 million. This prompted the attention of the Department of Justice who
later criminally prosecuted the defendants in this case. See Elizabeth Santoro, Woman
Forced Into Slavery Wins Jury Verdict Against California Couple, Law Reporter (Nov
2004), available at <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3898/is 200411/ain9462798/>
(last visited July 9, 2009). Thus, an additional public benefit of trafficked private attorney
general actions is to alert government authorities of unlawful conduct.
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[C]ourts have struggled with the distinctions between
race and national origin in the context of § 1981 claims...
it is appropriate to analyze § 1981 claims in terms of an-
cestry and ethnic characteristics where discrimination is
not based solely on national origin ... ancestry and ethnic
characteristics . . . entitle [plaintiffs] to claim the protec-
tions of § 1981.275
In Deressa v Gobena,276 a trafficked domestic worker as-
serted a § 1985 claim against the defendant traffickers. The
plaintiff needed to establish that discriminatory animus based on
a "discrete, insular, and immutable characteristic ... such as
race, national origin, and sex," motivated the defendants to con-
spire to interfere with the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection under the laws.277 The claim survived
the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court allowed the plaintiff
to bring a § 1985 claim motivated by defendants' "desire to de-
prive Plaintiff [of] her rights to be free from slavery as a direct
result of Plaintiff's being an alien, female, and of African de-
cent."278 The court reasoned that each of "these attributes is a
discrete, insular, and immutable characteristic deserving of
heightened protection under the Constitution. '" 279 Even though
the defendants were also of African descent, the court found that
membership in the same class did not eliminate the possibility
that the defendants could have a "discriminatory animus toward
other persons due to alienage, sex, or African descent."28 0
In another recent case, David v Signal Intl, LLC,28 1 the
plaintiff class of five hundred Indian workers trafficked to work
in the defendant's factory brought suit against their employer for
various workplace violations including claims under the TVPA,
FLSA, § 1981 and § 1985. The plaintiffs in this ongoing case
sought a protective order prohibiting disclosure of their immigra-
tion status and other personal information. The court issued the
protective order acknowledging the "[inherent] in terrorem effect
275 Chellen, 434 F Supp 2d at 1104.
276 2006 WL 335629 (E D Va Feb 13, 2006).
277 Id at *5.
278 See id at *5 (E D Va Feb. 13, 2006). The plaintiff in this case also used 42 USC
§ 1985(3) as a mechanism to allege a cause of action for violations of the Thirteenth
Amendment and 18 USC § 1584 (2006).
279 Deressa, 2006 WL 335629, at *5.
280 Id.
281 2009 WL 874520 (E D La Apr 2 2009).
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of inquiring into a party's immigration status" and that "discov-
ery of such information would have an intimidating effect on an
employee's willingness to assert his workplace rights ... serious-
ly undermin[ing] the effectiveness of the FLSA."28 2 The court
concluded that the "public interest in allowing employees to en-
force their workplace rights" outweighed the defendant's interest
in discovery of this information. 28 3
These cases have advanced the substantive guarantees of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and related civil
rights statutes. In addition to the promotion of substantive law
norms, trafficking civil litigation has prompted legislative
change. For example, a California trafficking private right of ac-
tion was enacted in 2005.284 Section 52.5 provides that a traffick-
ing victim may bring a civil action for actual, compensatory, and
punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.28 5 Section 52.5 also
provides for treble damages and attorneys' fees, costs, and expert
witness fees to the prevailing plaintiff.28 6 Furthermore, the sta-
tute of limitations (of five years for adult plaintiffs28 7 and eight
years for minors after they reach majority age288) may be tolled
due to a variety of circumstances including a trafficked individu-
al's disability, minor status, lack of knowledge, psychological
trauma, cultural or linguistic isolation, inability to access victim
services, and threatening conduct from a defendant preventing a
trafficked individual from bringing a civil action.28 9
The 2008 changes to the TVPA also reflect the impact of
trafficking lawsuits. As described in Part II, the 2008 TVPA ex-
pands trafficking-related civil claims to provide independent
causes of action for each provision of Chapter 77 Title 18 of the
282 Id at *7, *9.
283 Id at *8.
284 Sally Lieber, Press Release: AB 22: Rare Show of Unity: Law Enforcement Leaders
Join with Activists for Civil Rights and Women's Rights to Announce Governor's Signature
of Comprehensive Human Trafficking Bill, available at <http://www.sfdistrictattorney.
org/News.asp?id=25> (last visited July 9, 2009).
285 Cal Civil Code §52.5(a) (West 2009) ("A victim of human trafficking... may bring
a civil action for actual damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive
relief, any combination of those, or any other appropriate relief.").
286 Id ("A prevailing plaintiff may also be awarded attorney's fees and costs.").
287 Cal Civil Code § 52.5(c) ("An action brought pursuant to this section shall be com-
menced within five years of the date on which the trafficking victim was freed from the
trafficking situation.").
288 Id ("An action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced ... if the vic-
tim was a minor when the act of human trafficking against the victim occurred, within
eight years after the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority.").
289 Cal Civil Code § 52.5(d--e).
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U.S. Code, signaling a policy response to earlier cases that re-
jected such claims. For example, in the 2007 case Cruz v Toliv-
er,290 the court dismissed the plaintiff's § 1581 (peonage) and
§ 1592 (document servitude) claims, finding that "[w]here Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally pre-
sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the dis-
parate inclusion or exclusion."291 The Cruz court reasoned that
the 2003 trafficking private right of action specifically provided
for private causes of action under §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591, but
omitted private causes of action for §§ 1581 and 1592.292 There-
fore, the court argued that if it had been the intent of Congress to
include private causes of action for §§ 1581 and 1592, it would
have explicitly done so in § 1595.293 The 2008 addition of causes
of action for each provision of Chapter 77 Title 18 increases the
reach of trafficked private attorney generals to vindicate the full
range of Thirteenth Amendment related harms.
The extra-territorial provision 294 of the 2008 TVPA may also
indicate a congressional response to legal obstacles raised in traf-
ficking civil lawsuits against overseas defendants. In Roe v Brid-
gestone,295 the plaintiffs, workers in a Liberian rubber plantation,
brought suit for forced labor against Bridgestone and Firestone
corporations and holdings. Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged
violation of § 1589 and sought relief pursuant to § 1595. The de-
fendants sought to dismiss the claim arguing that even if the
conditions on the plantation in Liberia amounted to forced labor,
§ 1589 did not apply to labor conditions outside the United
States. Finding no previous case law on the issue, the court con-
cluded that § 1595 did "not provide a remedy for alleged viola-
290 2007 WL 1031621 (W D Ky March 30, 2007).
291 Id at *1, citing Gozlon-Peretz v United States, 498 US 395, 404 (1991).
292 18 USC § 1595 (2003).
293 The court also cited older cases in other jurisdictions which denied implied rights
of action for § 1581. Weiss v Sawyer, 28 F Supp 2d 1221, 1227 (W D Okla 1997) (denying a
private cause of action for § 1581); Dolla v Unicast Co, 930 F Supp 202, 205 (E D Pa 1996)
(ruling similar to Weiss in denying a private cause of action under § 1581).
294 18 USC § 1596 (2008). "In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial jurisdiction
otherwise provided by law, the courts of the United States have extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense) under section
1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591 [18 USCS § 1581, 1583, 1584, 1589, 1590, or 1591]
if-(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence (as those terms are defined in section 101 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 USC 1101); or (2) an alleged offender is present in the United
States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender." Id.
295 Roe v Bridgestone Corp, 492 F Supp 2d 988 (S D Ind 2007).
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tions of § 1589's standards that occur outside the United
States."296 The court relied on the general presumption derived
from Supreme Court precedent that "[u]nless a contrary intent
appears, [congressional legislation] is meant to apply only within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."297 The court rec-
ognized the international nature of trafficking, but contended
that unless made explicit, § 1589 must be presumed to apply do-
mestically: "The other closely related statutes addressing slavery
and related practices in Chapter 77 of Title 18 show that Con-
gress has been acquainted with the question of international
reach in this context for more than 200 years. Congress knows
how to legislate with extraterritorial effect in this field. It has
done so expressly when it has intended to do so."298 The District
Court for the District of Columbia reached a similar conclusion
in Nattah v Bush,299 referencing the Bridgestone decision. 300 The
2008 TVPA codifies extra-territorial jurisdiction for trafficking
violations, superseding these court decisions.
In sum, these legislative enactments indicate the strong
public function served by the trafficked private attorney general
to influence policy reform. Augmenting the public function of the
trafficked private attorneys general is their role in addressing
trafficking violations left unprosecuted by government actors.
The precedents generated from trafficking lawsuits enlarge pro-
tections to other trafficked workers. And the trafficking litigation
itself advances important constitutional and civil rights.
296 Id at 999.
297 Id at 1000.
298 Id at 1002.
299 541 F Supp 2d 233 (D DC Mar 31, 2008).
300 Id at 234-35.
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The culmination of these private and public benefits weighs
in favor of legal rules supporting the trafficked private attorney
general. The 2008 TVPA comports with this objective by further
"enabling" the trafficked private attorney general through the
authorization of immigration status for all trafficked workers
who sue their traffickers in civil court, thereby eliminating im-
migration restrictions and prioritizing the trafficked workers'
civil rights.30 2
As explained in the next Section, undocumented plaintiffs
who experience workplace abuse would promote similar public
benefits, thus, calling for the extension of an equivalent form of
immigration relief to "enable"30 3 injured undocumented workers
to act as private attorneys general.
C. The Private-Public Functions of the Undocumented Private
Attorney General
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the TVPA,
particularly in light of its recent expansion, may cover a broad
spectrum of worker abuses, including those described in Part 1.304
However, a distinction between trafficked workers and exploited
undocumented workers continues to play out in the law. For ex-
ample, while the Audubon workers were recognized as traffick-
ing victims and deserving of immigration relief, the undocu-
mented workers at Agriprocessors and Howard Industries, even
though exploited, were detained and deported. Thus, this Section
argues that notwithstanding the merits or arbitrariness of this
301 This chart lists the identified private and public benefits of trafficked private at-
torney general lawsuits.
302 The 2008 TVPA also provides for a ten year statute of limitations.
303 Rubenstein, 57 Vand L Rev at 2171.
304 Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers (cited in note 27).
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distinction, immigration relief should be extended to undocu-
mented workers, because, similar to trafficked private attorneys
general, they play an important role in the furtherance of subs-
tantive legal norms and societal values.
Like trafficked private attorneys general, the undocumented
worker as private attorney general would be characterized as
supplemental to the governmental structure in place for enforc-
ing workplace violations. As described in Part I, labor protections
in low-wage industries highly populated by undocumented work-
ers are grossly underenforced. Undocumented workers injured by
their employers could fill this gap by holding their employers
directly accountable for workplace violations. As supplemental
private attorneys general, undocumented workers would exercise
a mix of private and public functions, the relative quantities of
which would inform the rules that "constrain" or "enable" them.
Though lacking immigration status, some undocumented
workers have courageously asserted their workplace rights, pro-
viding examples by which to assess the private and public bene-
fits generated from undocumented worker civil litigation. Indivi-
dually, successful lawsuits by injured undocumented workers
against their employers result in monetary damages. For exam-
ple, damages may include compensatory relief for wage and hour
violations as well as punitive awards for an employers' willful
retaliation. In Singh v Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Co, for example, a
federal court awarded $200,000 in punitive damages to the plain-
tiff, an undocumented worker who was held in INS detention
after his employer reported him to INS in retaliation for making
a wage and hour complaint.3 5 Civil litigation may also be a
source of empowerment for injured workers who may utilize the
civil process to hold their employers accountable for violating
their rights.
Deterrence is one of the public benefits associated with these
civil actions. As described in Part I, the prioritization of immi-
gration enforcement and the absence of effective labor protec-
tions in the industries populated by undocumented immigrants
allows unscrupulous employers to take advantage of workers
with impunity. Similar to the trafficking context, the threat of a
lawsuit for workplace violations creates significant financial dis-
305 See Singh v Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N D Cal 2002). See
also 29 USC § 216(b) (2000) (providing that an employer who violates the FLSA's anti-
retaliation clause is liable for compensatory and potentially punitive damages).
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incentives for an employer to engage in exploitive employment
practices.
The injured undocumented worker acting as private attor-
ney general also generates precedent reinforcing important sub-
stantive legal norms and public values. A line of cases has
upheld undocumented workers' rights under the FLSA. The
Singh court concluded that the employer violated the FLSA by
reporting his undocumented employee to the INS in retaliation
for a wage and hour complaint.30 6 In Contreras v Corinthian Vi-
gor Insurance Brokerage, the court found that the employer vi-
olated the FLSA by reporting an undocumented employee to the
INS in retaliation to a wage and hour complaint.30 7 In Liu v
Donna Karan Intl Inc, the court held that immigration status
was irrelevant to a claim of unpaid wages under the FLSA and
prohibited the defendant's discovery of the plaintiffs' status. 308
The Liu court explained that "the risk of injury to the plaintiffs if
such information were disclosed outweighs the need for its dis-
closure" and that disclosure would risk a "danger of intimidation"
and a "danger of destroying the cause of action," inhibiting plain-
tiffs from pursuing their rights. 30 9
This reasoning has been echoed in Title VII actions brought
by undocumented workers. In Rivera v Nibco, Inc, 310 the Ninth
Circuit upheld a protective order against the defendant's discov-
ery request of the plaintiffs' immigration status. The court de-
termined that "the chilling effect that the disclosure of plaintiffs'
immigration status could have upon their ability to effectuate
their rights ... outweighed NIBCO's interests in obtaining the
information."311 Were such discovery to be permitted, "countless
acts of illegal and reprehensible conduct would go unreported. '" 312
306 See Singh, 214 F Supp 2d at 1056.
307 Contreras v Corinthian Vigor Insurance Brokerage, Inc, 25 F Supp 2d 1053 (N D
Cal Oct 26, 1998)
308 Liu v Donna Karan Intl Inc, 207 F Supp 2d 191, 192 (S D NY June 20, 2002). See
also In re Reyes, 814 F2d 168, 170-71 (5th Cir 1987); Montoya v S.C.C.P. Painting Con-
tractors, Inc, 530 F Supp 2d 746, 749-50 (D Md Jan 14, 2008); Recinos-Recinos v Express
Forestry, Inc, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 2510, *43-45 (E D La Jan 23, 2006); Galaviz-Zamora v
Brady Farms, Inc, 230 FRD 499 (W D Mich Sept 23, 2005); Garcia-Andrade v Madra's
Cafe Corp, 2005 WL 2430195 (E D Mich Aug 3, 2005); Topo v Dhir, 210 FRD 76, 78 (S D
NY Sept 13, 2002); Flores v Amigon, 233 F Supp 2d 462, 463-65 (E D NY Sept 20, 2002);
Flores v Albertson's, Inc, 2002 US Dist LEXIS 6171, *16-19 (C D Cal Apr 9, 2002).
309 Liu, 207 F Supp 2d at 192-93 (hearing tr at 12), citing Ansoumana v Gristede's
Operating Corp, No 00 Civ 0253(AKH) (S D NY Nov 8, 2000).
310 364 F3d 1057 (9th Cir 2004).
311 Id at 1067-68.
312 Id at 1068.
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The court further found that allowing discovery would "unac-
ceptably burden[ ]" the public interest by constraining the pri-
vate attorney general.3 13
In rendering its decision, the court cited Supreme Court
precedent affirming the important public role assumed by the
Title VII plaintiff: "Congress has cast the Title VII plaintiff in
the role of 'a private attorney general,' vindicating a policy 'of the
highest priority' . . . an essential means of obtaining judicial en-
forcement of Title VII .... vindicat[ing] the important congres-
sional policy against discriminatory employment practices."314
Similar to many of the trafficking civil cases described above,
these decisions prioritize substantive civil rights and enable the
undocumented private attorney general by minimizing the im-
pact of immigration restrictions.
Like trafficking civil litigation, litigation on behalf of undo-
cumented workers has also encouraged policy reform. The impact
of the Supreme Court's Hoffman decision prompted government-
al agencies to prominently state their policies towards undocu-
mented immigrants. The Department of Labor issued a fact
sheet explaining that it enforces the FLSA "without regard to
whether an employee is documented or undocumented. '" 315 An
EEOC notice affirmed that the "Supreme Court's decision in
Hoffman in no way calls into question the settled principle that
undocumented workers are covered by the federal employment
discrimination statutes."316 The California legislature also re-
sponded by passing Senate Bill 1818, which reinforced undocu-
mented workers' right to protection under state laws and also
established that:
[A] person's immigration status is irrelevant to the issue
of liability, and in proceedings or discovery undertaken to
enforce those state laws no inquiry shall be permitted into
a person's immigration status except where the person
313 Id at 1069 ("Given Title VII's dependence on private enforcement, we find that the
national effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace would be hampered by the
discovery practices NIBCO seeks to validate here. We therefore conclude that discovery of
each plaintiff's immigration status constitutes a substantial burden, both on the plaintiffs
themselves and on the public interest in enforcing Title VII and FEHA.")
314 364 F3d at 1069.
315 See US Department of Labor, Fact Sheet #48.- Application of U.S. Labor Laws to
Immigrant Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the Wage
and Hour Division (Aug 19, 2002) , available at <http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/
whd/whdfs48.htm> (last visited July 9, 2009).
316 See <www.eeoc.gov/docs/undoc-rescind.html> (last visited July 9, 2009).
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seeking to make this inquiry has shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence that this inquiry is necessary in order to
comply with federal immigration law.317
Further, according to Professor Ontiveros, the Hoffman deci-
sion initiated a deeper understanding of core constitutional val-
ues: "Hoffman could be a jumping-off point for beginning to con-
sider ways in which the treatment of undocumented immigrant
workers could be considered a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution because the crea-
tion of a caste of workers of color laboring beneath the floor for
free labor replicated the harms which the Thirteenth Amend-
ment sought to eliminate."318 Thus, like trafficked plaintiffs, un-
documented private attorneys general have provided multiple
public benefits including the advancement of substantive legal
norms, legislative change, and deterrence.
317 Cal Civil Code § 3339(b) (2002); Cal Govt Code § 7285, et seq (2002); Cal Health
and Safety Code § 24000, et seq (2002); Cal Labor Code § 1171.5 (2002).
318 Maria Ontiveros, Labor Union Coalition Challenges to Governmental Action: De-
fending The Civil Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 2009 U Chi Legal F 103, 134-35.
304 [2009:
247] TRAFFICKED WORKER AS PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 305
THE UNDOCUMENTED PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
319
Private Benefits Public Benefits
Monetary damages Deterrence
Empowerment Precedent
Advancement of legal norms
Legislative and social changes
THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL SPECTRUM
320
Trafficked Private Attorney General
Undocumented Private Attorney General
< ---------------------------- I ---------------------------------
Private Monetary Damages Deterrence Public
Empowerment Precedent
Advancement of legal norms
Legislative/social change
These cases demonstrate that some undocumented workers
have accessed the civil justice system and, in doing so, have gen-
erated both private and public benefits. However, these cases
also illustrate the incredible challenges that undocumented
workers face in suing their employers, including immigration
detention and deportation resulting from their employer's retali-
ation and intrusive discovery requests during litigation. With the
exception of Hoffman, courts have held that a worker's immigra-
tion status is irrelevant to claims under the FLSA and other civil
rights statutes. Additionally, courts have found employers liable
for unlawful retaliation where they report a worker's undocu-
mented status in response to a civil complaint. Yet, these court
decisions do not alter immigration enforcement priorities to re-
move unlawfully present immigrants; and the mere threat of ex-
posing a plaintiff's undocumented status has a "serious chilling
319 Similar to the chart above, this chart lists the identified private and public benefits
generated by undocumented private attorney general actions.
320 The trafficked and undocumented private attorneys general exercise strong public
functions and so are placed closer to the "public" side on the spectrum. Their strong public
functions weigh in favor of developing rules that support and enable their roles as private
attorneys general.
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effect" on those contemplating civil suit and those who have al-
ready filed suit.321
Under the current immigration framework, the only re-
course for undocumented workers who sue their employers is the
Special Agent Field Manual (SAFM) 33.14(h), which instructs
immigration authorities to refrain from responding to employers'
attempts to retaliate against undocumented workers. 322 As ex-
plained earlier, this manual is a discretionary guideline and does
not prohibit immigration enforcement during a labor dispute.
Nonetheless, at least one immigration judge has cited the in-
struction to terminate removal proceedings against undocu-
mented workers who filed complaints against their employer for
unpaid wages and interference with their union organizing
rights.32 3 In that case, the employer retaliated by reporting the
workers' unlawful status to immigration authorities, who raided
the garment factory, detained the workers and placed them in
removal proceedings. The immigration judge ordered the release
of the workers reasoning that the operating instruction "was de-
signed to protect fundamental labor rights," and "the [INS's]
failure to adhere to [the instruction] invalidat[ed] [the] removal
proceedings." 324 Despite this ruling, undocumented workers who
assert their workplace-related civil rights do not possess secure
protection from deportation.325 As one immigrants' rights organi-
zation explains, "[t]he issue of protecting workers' right to assert
their labor rights ... is too important for it to be governed merely
by inter-agency agreements and discretionary internal guide-
lines. Instead, whether and how DHS gets involved in labor dis-
putes should be an issue governed by statute."326
Simply put, undocumented workers who act as private at-
torneys general remain vulnerable to deportation, compounding
the employer intimidation commonly experienced during litiga-
321 See generally Rebecca Smith, et al, Undocumented Workers: Preserving the Rights
and Remedies after Hoffman Plastic v. NLRB (Natl Employment Law Project 2002),
available at <http://www.nelp.org> (last visited Aug 30, 2004).
322 Questioning Persons During Labor Disputes, INS Special Agents Field Manual
33.14(h), available at <http://uscis.gov/graphicslawsregs/instruc.htm> (last visited July 9,
2009).
323 In the Matter of Herrera-Priego, US DOJ EOIR (July 10, 2003); Immigration Judge
Rules INS Agents are Bound by Former 01 287.3a Regarding Enforcement Actions Dur-
ing Labor Disputes, 17 No 5 Immigrants' Rights Update (Natt Immigration Law Center
Sept 4, 2003).
324 In the Matter of Herrera-Priego, US DOJ EOIR (July 10, 2003).
325 Id.
326 Issue Brief- Immigration Enforcement During Labor Disputes (cited in note 141).
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tion. For other undocumented workers, immigration enforcement
measures have prevented them from exposing and vindicating
workplace-related civil rights violations. 327 Most undocumented
immigrants are chilled from enforcing workplace rights and are
relegated to living in the shadows and complying with uncon-
scionable working conditions. Like the trafficked private attor-
ney general, the legal norms and values promoted by undocu-
mented workers in their suits against unscrupulous employers
support conferring them with immigration status to enable them
as private attorneys general.
Several scholars have addressed the topic of immigration
remedies for exploited undocumented workers. Professor Leticia
M. Saucedo argues that the EEOC and the DOL should play a
larger role in prosecuting unscrupulous employers and certifying
victims of labor abuse for U visa relief.328 Professor Lori A. Nes-
sel advocates for deferred action status to be provided to undo-
cumented workers who assert their labor rights. 329 Professor
Jennifer Gordon's concept of transnational labor citizenship
seeks to circumvent the problems associated with undocumented
worker status by providing safe and legal international migrant
worker mobility.33 0 My proposal for an immigration remedy to
undocumented workers is normatively consistent with the re-
commendations of these scholars, as it seeks to ameliorate the
exploitation of undocumented workers by easing the tension be-
tween immigration and civil rights laws. Yet, my suggested im-
migration remedy is distinct, since it is built upon the theory of
the private attorney general. However, like the trafficked private
attorney general, undocumented workers who sue unscrupulous
employers advance important legal norms and values, thus justi-
fying the conferral of immigration status to them to better equip
them as private attorneys general.
My proposal draws from the 2008 TVPA, which authorizes
continued presence for all trafficked workers who civilly sue their
traffickers. Like the 2008 TVPA, I offer a statutory immigration
remedy for undocumented workers who sue their employers for
327 See Part I.
328 Leticia M. Saucedo, A New 'U: Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant
Workers, 42 U Richmond L R 891 (2008) (discussing the viability of the new U visa classi-
fication in protecting undocumented immigrant workers suffering from workplace abuse
and eliminating labor exploitation).
329 Nessel, 36 Harv CR-CL L Rev 345 (cited in note 55).
330 Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S Cal L Rev at 504-05 (cited in note
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workplace-related civil rights violations. These workers may re-
quest continued presence from the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security. Continued presence would be available for
lawsuits arising under those workplace constitutional and civil
rights discussed in this Article-the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, the FLSA, the NLRA, and related civil
rights statutes, such as Title VII and §§ 1981 and 1985. In order
to reduce the incidence of fraudulent claims to continued pres-
ence and frivolous civil suits, eligibility would be demonstrated
by a well-pleaded civil complaint accompanied by an affidavit of
support from the judge presiding over the civil case. Similar to
the Audubon court's review of the plaintiffs' eligibility for U vi-
sas, a judge would examine the allegations in the record to de-
termine the sufficiency of the undocumented workers' claims for
purposes of obtaining continued presence. The courts' interest in
administrative efficiency would be outweighed by the public in-
terest in upholding these fundamental civil rights. Furthermore,
undocumented workers without legitimate claims would be de-
terred from initiating this process as it would expose their un-
lawful status and leave them open to deportation.
My proposal is modest. Continued presence is a temporary
form of immigration relief that provides work authorization. Yet,
as a statutory provision, it is more stable than other forms of dis-
cretionary immigration relief currently provided by DHS. For
example, deferred action has no statutory basis and is instead
merely "an act of administrative convenience to the government
which gives some cases lower priority."331 USCIS reports that
"the vast majority of cases in which deferred action is granted
involve medical grounds."332 Another form of discretionary immi-
gration relief, "stays of removal," require an "order of removal,
deportation or exclusion,"333 and would therefore not apply to
most undocumented individuals. By codifying continued presence
for undocumented workers acting as private attorney general,
undocumented workers would gain certainty with their status.
This statutory remedy accompanied by regulations that call for a
judge's affidavit of support would also reduce arbitrary immigra-
331 See US Department of Homeland Security, Recommendation from the CIS Om-
budsman to the Director, USCIS 1 (Apr 6, 2007), available at <http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/ClSOmbudsman_RR_32 0 DeferredActionO4-06-07.pdf> (last visited
July 9, 2009).
332 Id.
333 See US DOJ/EOIR, Practice Manual 93 (July 30, 2004), available at <http:/!
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanuallchap6.pdf'> (last visited July 9, 2009).
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tion decisions. Over time, the positive externalities generated by
undocumented private attorney general lawsuits may weigh in
favor of longer-term immigration status for these individuals. If
the relationship between trafficking litigation and the 2008
TVPA is any indication, then undocumented private attorney
general actions will encourage legislative reform that further
enables the undocumented worker with broader immigration and
civil rights.
CONCLUSION
The inherent tension between immigration law and civil
rights has come to full fruition with ICE's increased focus on
workplace enforcement. The arrest and removal of undocu-
mented workers is not an abuse of governmental authority. Ra-
ther it is a lawful execution of IRCA and our nation's immigra-
tion policy to prohibit unauthorized labor and migration. Howev-
er, the implementation of ICE's worksite enforcement measures
has also circumvented the civil workplace rights of undocu-
mented workers victimized by labor exploitation. By detaining
and deporting these individuals, the workplace violations they
may have suffered remain unvindicated and unenforced.
I present the theory of the private attorney general as a use-
ful normative framework for reversing the current prioritization
of immigration enforcement over the civil rights of undocu-
mented workers. This theory aims to empower individual liti-
gants who advance interests that comport with our nation's
commitment to constitutional and civil rights. In support of this
theory, I suggest as a model, the trafficked worker as private at-
torney general, who is enabled to sue her trafficker through the
conferral of immigration status. In this context, the divergent
goals of immigration and civil rights laws are rectified, allowing
the trafficked plaintiff to obtain not only individual relief, but to
also promote the democratic ideals embodied by the Constitution
and civil rights legislation: freedom from slavery, exploitation,
and discrimination. A review of trafficking civil litigation illu-
strates the numerous public benefits gained through empowering
the trafficked worker as private attorney general. A comparative
analysis of litigation in the undocumented worker context re-
veals similar potential benefits. Thus, the trafficked worker as
private attorney general represents a model of civil rights en-
forcement. If replicated by undocumented workers victimized by
labor exploitation, this model would allow these workers to ad-
vance civil justice without the risk of deportation.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: CASES PLEADING TRAFFICKING CIVIL REMEDY 33 4
Court - Filing Date"'r5  Criminal
listed in chronological Factual Allegations3 36 Type of Labor 7  Investigation /
order ProsecutionS
E D La Dec 2008 Plaintiffs trafficked from Agricultural Yes
Mexico and forced to
work in defendant's
strawberry farms in
Louisiana. Plaintiffs'
passports were confis-
cated and they were paid
less than minimum wage
under threats of deporta-
tion and serious harm.
(table continues)
331 Court cases pleading 18 USC § 1595 claim. See also Jennifer Nam, The Case of the
Missing Case: Examining the Civil Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107
Colum L Rev 1655-1703 (2007) (providing a similar table summarizing Section 1595 cases
through August 2007).
335 Case names and numbers have been redacted to minimize the risk of future harm
to the plaintiffs. Case names, case numbers and pleadings are on file with the author.
Filing dates of complaints indicated by month and year.
336 This column briefly summarizes facts alleged in the complaints.
337 This column categorizes the type of labor at issue in each case. As this table indi-
cates, the predominant forms of labor in civil trafficking cases include domestic work,
agricultural work, and construction. Out of a total of thirty-one cases, domestic work
comprised fourteen cases, agricultural work comprised nine cases, and construction com-
prised four. The remaining cases included restaurant, hotel, and other menial labor. Civil
cases on behalf of sex trafficking victims have been rare. Doe v Reddy, No. 02 Civ. 05570,
2003 US Dist LEXIS 26120 at *31-37 (N D Cal 2003) provides one example of a case in-
volving both trafficking for labor and sex that pre-dated the TVPRA. There are legitimate
reasons for the relative absence of sex trafficking civil cases. Criminal prosecutions in sex
trafficking cases are far more likely to occur than prosecutions in labor trafficking cases.
As a result, the victims are often re-traumatized from their involvement in the criminal
prosecution and are far more susceptible to retaliation from the traffickers who are fre-
quently agents within a large criminal network and can utilize their networks to retaliate
against victims. In addition, sex trafficking cases present unique factors that impact a
potential civil lawsuit. First, since a criminal prosecution is likely in sex trafficking cases,
if successful, victims may receive monetary compensation through criminal restitution.
Second, the FLSA, which is applied in most civil cases to assess compensatory damages,
excludes prostitution as a compensable form of labor due to its illegality. Finally, because
of the clandestine nature of sex trafficking crimes, it may be more difficult to identify
defendants and locate assets. See, generally, Kathleen Kim and Dan Werner, Civil Litiga-
tion on Behalf of Human Trafficking Victims, 3rd ed (2008), available at
<http://Ilibrary.lls.edu/atlast/> (last visited August 19, 2009). See also Nam, 107 Colum L
Rev at 1655-1703 (cited in note 334).
338 This column indicates whether the civil docket or pleadings reveal an ongoing
criminal investigation or prosecution by federal or state law enforcement authorities.
Section 1595 authorizes a stay on the civil case in the event of a criminal investigation or
proceeding. Thus, a stay order by a judge presiding over the civil case will be indicated in
the case docket.
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Table 1 Cont'd
Court - Filing Date Criminal
listed in chronological Factual Allegations Type of Labor Investigation I
order Prosecution
E D Wis Sept 2008 Plaintiff, a Filipino Domestic Work Yes
woman, was forced to
work as a domestic ser-
vant in the U.S. by de-
fendants. Defendants
confiscated her passport
and exploited her undoc-
umented status.
C D Cal Aug 2008 Action for damages Menial Labor No
brought by the family
members of 12 men and
one surviving laborer
who were trafficked
across international
borders to provide meni-
al labor at a US military
facility for defendants,
which are US military
contractors.
D Conn June 2008 Six Ecuadorean family Restaurant Yes
members filed suit
against the owners of a
bakery in Connecticut,
for back wages and
forced labor. Alleged
employer misconduct
included sexual harass-
ment, sexual abuse, and
threats of deportation.
S D Fl June 2008 Plaintiffs trafficked from Domestic Work No
Peru to provide domestic
and childcare work
under false promises of
receiving legal immigra-
tion status. Defendants
confiscated their pass-
ports, failed to pay the
promised wages, pro-
vided substandard hous-
ing and threatened them
with deportation.
D Colo Apr 2008 Plaintiffs, Mexican citi- Agriculture No
zens, incurred substan-
tial expenses in reliance
on defendants' promise
of work in the United
States. Defendants did
not pay minimum wage
and threatened the
workers with immigra-
tion enforcement.
(table continues)
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Table 1 Cont'd
Court - Filing Date Criminal
listed in chronological Factual Allegations Type of Labor Investigation /
order Prosecution
E D La Mar 2008 Plaintiffs are a class of Construction No
over 500 Indian men
trafficked to work for
defendant's construction
company in the after-
math of Hurricane Ka-
trina. Plaintiffs paid
exorbitant fees upon
false promises of receiv-
ing LPR status. Plain-
tiffs subjected to egre-
gious working and living
conditions and strictly
monitored by guards.
E D La Mar 2008 Plaintiffs filed suit Construction No
against their employer
for forced labor and
nonpayment of wages.
Defendants provided
plaintiffs with substand-
ard housing and threat-
ened them with eviction
and law enforcement
arrest.
D NJ Oct 2007 Plaintiff from Mexico, Agriculture No
forced to labor on defen-
dant's farm in New
Jersey and live in sub-
standard housing with
limited access to food,
under threats of physical
abuse and immigration
enforcement.
E D NC Aug 2007 Plaintiffs are Thai citi- Agriculture No
zens, promised three
years of steady work in
the United States by
defendants. Upon arri-
val, plaintiffs were not
paid minimum wage,
they lived in substand-
ard housing, monitored
by defendants, and their
passports were confis-
cated.
LA Super Ct Aug 2007 Plaintiff, an Indonesian Domestic Work Yes
woman, forced to work as
domestic worker in the
United States without
compensation. Defend-
ants confiscated her
passport and prohibited
her from going outside or
contacting anyone within
the United States.
(table continues)
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Table 1 Cont'd
Court - Filing Date Criminal
listed in chronological Factual Allegations Type of Labor Investigation I
order Prosecution
E D NY July 2007 Plaintiff, an Indian Ministerial and No
Hindu priest, was offered Janitorial
employment at a reli-
gious organization in the
United States. Defen-
dants deprived Plaintiff
of his passport, failed to
provide him with a hab-
itable living space, and
forced him to provide
janitorial and mainten-
ance services in addition
to his religious and
ministerial duties.
D DC Apr 2007 Plaintiff is a Tanzanian Domestic Work No
woman forced to work as
a domestic worker with-
out compensation, not
permitted to leave the
home alone, and sub-
jected to physical and
emotional abuse.
N D Cal Apr 2007 Plaintiff, an Indonesian Domestic Work Yes
woman, was promised a
simple housekeeping job,
but was forced into do-
mestic servitude upon
her arrival for four
years.
E D NY Mar 2007 Plaintiff, a Bangladeshi Domestic Work Yes
woman, forced to serve
as a domestic worker and
nanny. Plaintiffs pass-
port was confiscated and
she was subjected to
physical, emotional, and
psychological harm.
D Conn Feb 2007 Plaintiffs, Guatemalan Agricultural No
citizens, trafficked to
Connecticut to labor in
defendants' tree nurse-
ries. Plaintiffs were
forced to work nearly 80
hours per week for far
less than minimum
wage. Defendants confis-
cated plaintiffs' pass-
ports, restricted their
travel and communica-
tion, and threatened
plaintiffs with arrest and
deportation.
(table continued)
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Table 1 Cont'd
Court - Filing Date Criminal
listed in chronological Factual Allegations Type of Labor Investigation I
order Prosecution
D DC Jan 2007 Three female Indian Domestic Work Yes
plaintiffs brought civil
suit against a Kuwaiti
diplomat and his wife,
alleging that they trans-
ported the plaintiffs into
the U.S. and forced them
to work as domestic
servants in their home
through physical and
verbal abuse and under
threats of harm and jail.
D Or Nov 2006 Female plaintiff traf- Domestic Work No
ficked from Ethiopia to
Oregon was forced to
work for seven years
under defendant's
threats of jail and depor-
tation.
S D NY June 2006 Plaintiff, an Indian Domestic Work No
woman, sued a Kuwaiti
diplomat for forced labor
as a domestic worker,
who was subjected to
physical, sexual, and
psychological abuse.
D Colo June 2006 Six Chilean cattle herd- Agricultural No
ers brought suit against
the owners of a ranch in
Colorado. Four plaintiffs
alleged they were forced
to work under threats of
serious harm or legal
retaliation.
D Colo Apr 2006 Farm workers forced to Agricultural Yes
work under threats of
physical harm, extraor-
dinary levels of control
and intimidation, threat-
ened abuse of the legal
process, and a scheme of
debt bondage.
S D NY Dec 2005 Plaintiff forced to work Construction No
at a Bronx construction
site by the defendant,
who locked him in the
construction site at
night, seized his pass-
ports and other docu-
ments, and assaulted
him.
(table continues)
247] TRAFFICKED WORKER AS PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 315
Table 1 Cont'd
Court - Filing Date Criminal
listed in chronological Factual Allegations Type of Labor Investigation /
order Prosecution
D N Mar I Dec 2005 Plaintiff brought from Domestic Work Yes
China to Saipan under
false promises of em-
ployment. Upon arrival,
she was forced to work
as a housekeeper and
childcare provider, under
threatened and actual
physical harm.
C D Cal Nov 2005 Class action suit brought Agricultural No
on behalf of 12 adult and
23 child plaintiffs forced
to work on Firestone
Plantation in Liberia to
meet daily quotas of
tapping rubber trees in
exchange for a minimal
salary.
C D Cal July 2005 Three Malian plaintiffs Agricultural No
trafficked into Cote
d'Ivoire as minors to
work at cocoa bean plan-
tations owned by defen-
dant corporations. Plain-
tiffs allege they were
beaten, never paid, and
locked in guarded rooms.
E D NY July 2005 Plaintiff, an Ecuadorian Domestic Work No
woman, trafficked under
false pretenses, forced to
work as a domestic
worker without pay and
passport confiscated.
W D Ky Dec 2004 Plaintiff trafficked to the Domestic Work No
U.S. from the Philippines
as a domestic servant
and forced to work to pay
off $8,000 smuggling
debt.
C D Cal Sept 2004 Sri Lankan woman Domestic Work No
brought to the U.S. upon
false promises of paid
work. Her personal
documentation was
confiscated and she was
forced to work for two
households, under
threats of serious harm
or deportation.
(table continues)
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Court - Filing Date Criminal
listed in chronological Factual Allegations Type of Labor Investigation I
order Prosecution
S D NY May 2004 Five female Latina Hotel No
plaintiffs hired as
housekeepers for a New
York mid-level hotel.
They were subjected to
harassment by managers
and forced to work long
hours at subminimum
wage upon threats of
force and deportation.
D Minn Mar 2004 Plaintiff traveled from Domestic Work No
Nigeria to California
upon false promises that
she would receive a
paying job and receive
help in obtaining proper
documentation to work.
Instead, upon arrival,
defendant confiscated
her passport and forced
plaintiff to work in de-
fendant's home for no
pay.
E D La Jan 2004 Indian plaintiffs traf- Construction No
ficked by defendants
under false pretenses
and debt bondage. Plain-
tiffs' passports confis-
cated and they were
forced to work under
threats of deportation
and legal retaliation.
